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ABSTRACT 
 
Theoretically, elite polarization should lead to public polarization but it does not always happen. 
This Master’s thesis examines what factors lead to mass polarization when parties are polarized. 
12 cases with high elite polarization and varying mass polarization in the EU member states were 
selected from the sample of 56 cases based on the national elections taking place since 2008 and 
until 2017. Using Qualitative Comparative Analysis it was found that public opinion becomes 
polarized in the conditions of elite polarization if there is a crisis at the EU level, Eurosceptics 
reached 10% of electoral support and either Eurosceptic parties are present on both left and right 
sides of ideological scale and salience of European integration in the party’s public stance is high, 
or media salience of the EU is high and people often discuss the EU political matters. The second 
part of the analysis was process tracing and it unfolded the mass polarization process in Greece 
from 2009 until 2015. It showed that a greater number of ideologically diverse parties that could 
effectively use the opportunity structure fostered mass polarization, while the EU crises, in turn, 
strengthened the opportunity structure. 
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1. Introduction 
EU politics have become vibrant over the last years. The once the pro-European bastion, the EP 
involves one-third Eurosceptic members (Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou 2014) for the second 
time and more Eurosceptic parties get places in national parliaments and governments all over the 
European Union. The voter turnout on the recent European Parliament elections increases 
significantly. In 20 member states, the national turnout increased, while the overall turnout reached 
50,66 per cent that is the highest value since 1994 (European Parliament, 2019). Citizens also do 
not take the EU for granted. According to the survey conducted in 2018, 62 per cent of people 
consider their country’s membership of the European Union to be a good thing, which is the 
highest figure since 1983. It could be a side effect of the complicated Brexit process (European 
Parliament, 2018). 
 
Although the signs of politicization of the EU was observed since the late 1980s (De Wilde and 
Zürn, 2012, 140) or even since the early 1970s (Grande and Kriesi, 2014, 281), it is a new 
phenomenon in most countries. The level of politicization was low in comparison with other 
political issues and some countries politicization achieved an adequate level only in the 2000s 
(Grande and Kriesi, 2014, 110).  
 
According to the theory, the EU crisis should influence «party competition over European 
integration, including EU issue position, EU issue salience, and EU issue framing» (Vasilopoulou, 
2018, 312). Some authors claim that in times of Europe’s multiple crises elites become highly 
polarized over the EU (Vasilopoulou, 2018, 312). Since 2009 there was a series of crisis at the EU 
that contributed to politicizing of the EU (De Wilde and Zürn, 2012, 145). The Lisbon treaty 
negotiations, the European debt crisis, the European migrant crisis, and the Brexit have provoked 
debate about the EU in the member states. For example, the euro crisis caused extremely salient 
debates and “increased visibility of Europe in the politics of the European nation states” (Grande 
and Kriesi, 2014, 273). The tension of the conflict was high not only in countries that were hardest 
hit by the crisis. For example, the crisis caused a high level of politicization in Germany (Grande 
and Kriesi, 2014, 276). The euro crisis debate took place even in non-member of Eurozone 
countries, although there the debate was less lively (Grande and Kriesi, 2014, 273). 
 
Elite polarization is a part of the politicization process (Hutter et al., 2016, 8). Polarization of 
parties on the EU increased over time (Grande and Kriesi, 2014, 283). “Constraining dissensus” 
replaced the dominated “permissive consensus” (Down and Wilson 2008, 26). For a long time 
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parties did not offer the voters different visions of Europe (Van Der Eijk and Franklin, 2004, 37-
39), but the Eurosceptic fringe parties started to openly campaign on EU polity issues (Adam et 
al., 2013, 88). Parties like the National Front and the Freedom Party of Austria took a more distinct 
position, increased the salience of the issue (Down and Wilson 2008, 29) and awakened the 
“slipping giant” (Grande and Kriesi, 2014).  
 
Nowadays European integration has become an issue of mass politics and looking back at 
everything that has happened recently, it seems that the politicization of the EU is the key to an 
understanding the current main problems of the EU (Grande and Kriesi, 2014,3). 
 
It is important to understand the effects of rising polarization on the voters. According to the 
theory, elite polarization should lead to public polarization (Down and Wilson, 2010; Ray, 2003; 
Hooghe and Marks, 2005). The elite polarization should decrease the cognitive cost of 
sophisticated electoral choice (Lachat, 2008, 687-688), makes it easier for voters to understand 
parties’ clues (Singer, 2016, 177), increases mass consistency (Levendusky, 2010, 114-115). More 
confrontational debates, emerging due to greater polarization, can alleviate the lack of clarity for 
citizens (Brack 2015, 347).  
 
Despite the theoretical expectations, elite polarization does not always lead to mass polarization. 
Although the parties are polarized in the USA, many studies proved that across most issues 
Americans are ideologically moderate (Zingher and Flynn, 2018, 24). The scientists developed the 
different factors that can influence this process (Hetherington, 2001; Rogowski, 2018) but the one 
consolidated set of factors has not been developed yet. Furthermore, as the concept of polarization 
is especially popular in the USA (Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz, 2006), the focus of the study is 
often the USA. Although the politicization of the EU can be perceived as a part of the 
normalization of the EU politics (Statham and Trenz, 2013), the process of it and polarization as 
it’s dimension can differ from the American experience due to the unique character of the EU. The 
only study that analyzes why in some cases the elite polarization on the EU lead to the mass 
polarization on the EU, while in others it does not is the study of Down and Wilson (2010). 
However, Down and Wilson analyzed the polarization for the years 1988, 1992, 1996, 1999 and 
2002 (2010, 73) before the time when the politicization of the EU has increased significantly 
(Grande and Kriesi, 2014). The electoral success of Eurosceptic parties has increased significantly 
(Brack, 2015b), as the salience of the EU integration issue and its coverage by parties (Ray, 2003, 
988). As it was mentioned, since 2008 there was a series of crisis at the EU level that theoretically 
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should force national parties to include the EU issues in their national agenda. It is important to 
see what factors lead to mass polarization in the new political environment. 
 
To answer this question 12 cases with high elite polarization were selected. To select cases the 
results of elections taking place since 2008 and until 2017 were analyzed. In this sample of 12 
cases in 5 cases the public opinion was polarized as well: France in 2017, Greece in 2012, Austria 
in 2013, Greece in 2015 and the UK in 2017. In the remaining 7 cases elites were polarized but 
the public opinion was not: Hungary in 2014, Italy in 2013, the UK in 2010, Poland in 2015, 
Greece in 2009, Netherlands in 2017, Portugal 2011. The aim of this study is to define what sets 
of factors lead to mass polarization when parties are polarized. To do it the Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (QCA) is used in this study. It will allow producing all possible 
combinations of conditions that lead to mass polarization when the elite is polarized, identifying 
the sufficient and necessary conditions. After that, the process-tracing analysis will be done to get 
more information about the cases and how these conditions work in practice. The case of Greece 
will be analyzed as there are three points of time in our sample. In Greece, the elite had been 
polarized already in 2009, but the public opinion had not been polarized until 2012. Process tracing 
allows unfolding the mass polarization process in conditions of elite polarization over time. 
 
Following this introduction, the thesis contains three main chapters. The first chapter outlines the 
theoretical framework for studying polarization. As the outcome of this chapter the list of factors 
influencing mass polarization on the EU will be developed and directional expectations will be 
formulated. The second chapter details the case selection process, method description, data 
collection, operationalization and calibration of the variables. The third chapter presents the 
analysis and the results of the study. Some final conclusions are then presented. 
 
I express my appreciation to the supervisors of this thesis Stefano Braghiroli and Anna Dekalchuk 
for the support and help in developing the research idea and design of this study. I also express my 
appreciation to Martin Molder, a researcher at the University of Tartu, for support in addressing 
the methodological issues and valuable feedback. 
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2. Literature review 
2.1. The concepts’ definition 
Politicization 
There is no one definition or framework for EU politicization. De Wilde claims that the discussion 
evolved around the distinct forms and functions of EU politicization. The main forms are: 
increasing political conflict in the EU level polity; increasing relevance of political actors compare 
to technocrats in decision-making; and increasing public contentiousness of European issues. The 
main functions are: (re)structuring political conflict; bringing questions of legitimacy; changing 
the character of integration and the EU (2011, 560–566). 
 
Hutter et al., who are the key scholars in studying politicization, define external and internal 
politicization. External politicization means “the extension of the scope of the political system vis-
à-vis the (capitalist) economy”. Internal politicization means “an expansion of the scope of conflict 
within the political system” (2016, 7) and this definition will be used in this study. There are 
alternative definitions such as the one of Pieter De Wilde and Michael Zurn: “the process by means 
of which decision-making powers and the associated authoritative interpretations of facts and 
circumstances are brought into the political sphere – that is, transported either into the political 
sub-system (defined by the ability to make collectively binding decisions) or into the political 
space (defined by public debates about the right course in handling a given problem)” (2012, 139). 
However, the definition of Hutter et al. is broader and includes Schattschneider’s concept of 
conflict as the heart of politics (2016, 7) that is related to the idea of this research.  
 
Polarization  
The concept of polarization has deep roots. It has been built on the spatial model that Down 
introduced (Evans, 2004). Nowadays the concept is especially popular in the USA. Since the 1970s 
the polarization of both the House and Senate has increased steadily and the Republican Party and 
the Democratic Party are very polarized about almost all issues (Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz 
2006, 84). Scholars have covered a wide range of countries from developing democracies (Singer, 
2016) to Europe (Kurella and Pappi, 2015), but still mostly focus on the USA. 
 
Polarization is closely tied with politicization. Hutter et al. see it as one of the dimensions of 
politicization along with issue salience and actor expansion (range). All these dimensions may be 
intercorrelated, but they are at least partly independent. According to Hutter et al., issue salience 
is a predominant condition for politicization, but all are necessary for full understanding of the 
phenomena of politicization (2016, 8). Pieter De Wilde and Michael Zurn also believe that an 
  
 
10 
increasing polarization of opinions, interests or values is one of indicators of politicization as well 
as rising awareness, which means greater engagement of citizens, and mobilization, which points 
to an increase in the amount of resources spent (2012, 140).  
 
Hutter et al. define polarisation as “the intensity of conflict related to an issue among the different 
actors involved” (2016, 9). Evans mentions that Sartori distinguished between polarization as a 
static concept and as a dynamic concept. Static polarization means distance between parties, 
whereas dynamic polarization means a widening distance between them (Evans, 2002, 167). The 
focus of study is concentrated on the static polarization and on the more classical definition created 
by Dalton: “the degree of ideological differentiation among political parties in a system” (2008, 
900).  
 
Some scientists believe that a party system becomes polarized when parties are apart from each 
other ideologically and at the same time are homogenous internally (Zingher and Flynn, 2018, 23; 
Druckman et al., 2013, 57). At the same time elite level polarization can be asymmetric. This 
happens when one party is more ideologically united than another like in the USA, for example, 
where the Democratic party is more ideological fragmentated than the Republicans (Thomsen, 
2014). 
 
2.2. Politicization of the EU 
The politicization of the EU does not take place along the Left-Right dimension and it is not a new 
cleavage, it is a part of the transformed cultural-conflict dimension (Grande and Kriesi, 2014, 191). 
Although the Left-Right dimension is important in EU politics, the politicization of the EU should 
not be reduced to it. The more-/less-EU division is also present and it “does not overlap with the 
Left-Right cleavage” (Papadopoulos and Magnette, 2010, 718). The EU dimension is still 
incoherent (Mair, 2007, 9-12), there is a greater gap between parties and voters on the EU 
dimension than on the left-right one (Hobolt, 2007, 166), but there can also be significant strategic 
potential. The majority of parties are not as deeply rooted to a specific stance on the EU as they 
are on domestic political issues, so it is easier to change positions strategically for electoral 
purposes (Down and Wilson, 2010, 64). 
The politicization of the EU has been documented since the late 1980s (De Wilde and Zürn, 2012, 
140), although some authors claim that the politicization can be observed in some countries as 
France and the UK since the early 1970s (Grande and Kriesi, 2014, 281). Politicization was part 
of a more fundamental process of “denationalization” (Grande and Kriesi, 2014, 191-193) and the 
  
 
11 
increasing political authority of the EU (De Wilde and Zürn, 2012, 138) that the Maastricht Treaty 
symbolized. The “permissive consensus”, which dominated before the Maastricht Treaty, when 
the public supported the EU and wanted to leave the issue to the elite, was replaced by 
“constraining dissensus”, as Hooghe and Marks have called it (Down and Wilson 2008, 26). Since 
the Maastricht Treaty, public support for the EU dropped in most countries and the EU as a whole 
(Down and Wilson, 2008, 37). On the other hand, some authors believe that the Maastricht Treaty 
was a main politicizing event, but it did not cause the politicization or even did not elevated the 
process of politicization of the EU to a new level (Grande and Kriesi, 2014, 281).  
Although the signs of polarization of the EU was observed since the late 1980s (De Wilde and 
Zürn, 2012, 140) or the early 1970s (Grande and Kriesi, 2014, 281), it is a new phenomenon in 
most countries. The level of politicization was low in comparison with other political issues. In 
some countries it achieved an adequate level only in the 2000s (Grande and Kriesi, 2014, 110). 
Parties constrained the politicization for a long time and did not offer the voters different visions 
of Europe. According to Van Der Eijk and Franklin, voters had already had different positions on 
EU integration in 1999, but there was not a big difference between parties (2004, 37-39). This 
situation created a window of opportunity for parties with a clear pro-/anti-EU stance (Van Der 
Eijk and Franklin, 2004, 47). They called it a “sleeping giant” (Van Der Eijk and Franklin, 2004).  
A shift in voter orientations is one of the preconditions for greater politicization, however, it is not 
enough by itself. Political actors have to capitalize on it (Van Der Eijk and Franklin, 2004, 48). 
The presence of Eurosceptic parties was crucial for politicization and activation of the potential 
that existed on the demand side (Hernández and Kriesi, 2016, 516). Mair claims that the giant was 
not only sleeping but sedated by the mainstream parties. The parties chose to talk about issues of 
the EU polity in the European Parliament, where it cannot prove decisive, and not to talk about 
them in national elections, where it is relevant. As a result, the EU dimension was remarkably 
depoliticized because the preferences of citizens were mainly irrelevant to the outputs of the 
system (Mair, 2007, 12-13). As Vivien Schmidt claimed, the EU was a “polity without politics” 
(Mair, 2007, 7).  
While mainstream parties chose to depoliticize EU issues, Eurosceptic fringe parties started to 
openly campaign on EU polity issues (Adam et al., 2013, 88). Many scholars showed that 
Eurosceptic parties fostered politicization (Grande and Kriesi, 2014). Parties like the National 
Front and the Freedom Party of Austria took a more distinct position and increased the salience of 
the issue to capitalize on the issues (Down and Wilson 2008, 29). Mainstream parties still can 
avoid EU issues as it is newer and can harm their reputation. In this case, the challenger parties 
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tend to differentiate themselves by taking a more radical position and increasing the salience that 
leads to the intensification of the conflict over the EU (Vasilopoulou, 2018, 316). Mainstream 
parties can be forced to speak more about the EU by challenger parties and increased importance 
of the EU agenda (Vasilopoulou, 2018, 317). 
Nowadays European integration has become an issue of mass politics. Pieter De Wilde and 
Michael Zurn indicate that the number of citizens without an opinion “on important institutional 
questions such as EU membership” has dropped (De Wilde and Zürn, 2012, 149). Grande and 
Kriesi found that European integration has been a salient and contested issue in national elections 
since the 1990s. European integration accounts for 5.9 per cent of core statements, which is 
comparable to environmental issues and immigration (Grande and Kriesi, 2014, 198-199). 
However, according to Down and Wilson, Europe used to be an issue of contestation only in the 
EP elections and referendums on EU matters (Down and Wilson, 2010, 62). 
Some scientists believe that politicization of the EU might be a part of the normalization of the 
EU and political party competition, so, in other words, it makes the EU politics more similar to 
domestic politics. Criticism of European integration might lead to «a more mature political debate 
about what kind of Europe? rather than a simplistic for or against Europe» (Statham and Trenz, 
2013, 969). However, consequences of politicization for the future of the EU is a disputable 
question: while Hix believes that politicization will positively influence the public debates, 
reforms and the legitimacy of the EU, Bartolini is sure that politicization will undermine the 
integration process (Papadopoulos and Magnette, 2010, 713-714). Papadopoulos and Magnette 
argue with both scientists stating that politicization at the EU level is absorbed by «consociational 
mechanisms» so politicization is less promising and less dangerous (Papadopoulos and Magnette, 
2010, 714). Politicization gives better opportunities to articulate views and to mobilize citizens 
(Ray, 2003), but it was difficult for established actors to organize the potentials as the politicization 
of the European integration has not been caused by its’ supporters (Grande and Kriesi, 2014, 191-
192). 
2.3. How elite polarization influences mass polarization 
European integration has become a salient and contested issue. According to the theory, elite 
polarization should force mass polarization (Down and Wilson, 2010; Ray, 2003; Hooghe and 
Marks, 2005). To call society polarized citizens should be concentrated at ideological extremes 
and the poles should carry more weight than the centre (Zingher and Flynn, 2018, 24). 
 
Although it is still unclear if inter-party competition and public opinion on the EU are 
systematically related and what is the direction of this connection. So, parties can cause the 
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divisions among the electorate, or the conflict among parties can be caused by existed divisions 
among voters, or they can be interrelated. Down and Wilson call the last option a reciprocal 
relationship and, referring to Gabel and Scheve, claim that an increase in an intra-party division 
can make voters more divided that in turn can lead to a higher level of intra-party dissent (Down 
and Wilson 2010, 68). It also cannot be taken for granted that the public and party divisions on the 
EU are connected at all. The argument in favour of this position is that parties do not compete on 
the EU, according to some studies (Down and Wilson, 2010, 68). Also, Adams, L. Ezrow and Z. 
Somer-Topcu found that voters do not recognize when parties change their manifestos (2011).  
 
Zingher and Flynn showed that elite-level polarization has reshaped the political behaviour of the 
Americans (2018). Down and Wilson found that the more parties are polarized on the EU, the 
more widely dispersed and less peaked is public opinion. And they didn’t find significant evidence 
that the last can cause the former. However, the inter-party competition does not cause public 
division in all 11 countries that authors studied (Down and Wilson, 2010, 72-75). They also accept 
the possibility the causal relationship can be more complex than they stated. For example, a 
decrease in party competition does not necessarily lead to a more unified public opinion (Down 
and Wilson, 2010, 83).  
 
It is expected that elite polarization can influence public opinion because voters are usually are out 
of depth in politics and they know even less about the European level. For example, only 19 per 
cent knows about the Union’s political system and only 7 per cent could identify a member-state 
of the EU, so voters may need cues and heuristics to make vote (Hobolt, 2007, 154). Scientists 
argue if people just follow cues and ignore content or party sponsorship influences how people 
interpret information (Druckman et al., 2013, 59), but many scholars claim that mass opinion 
doesn’t tend to move significantly without parties’ signals (Hetherington, 2001, 622). 
Hetherington claimed that V.O. Key, Nie, Verba, Petrocik etc. believed that elite behaviour “set 
the terms by which the masses think about politics”: in a party-centric manner or an issue-centric 
manner (Hetherington, 2001, 622).  
 
In times of elite polarization, parties can influence citizens stronger. Druckman et al. found that 
party endorsements drive opinions only when opposing frames have similar strength under 
conditions of low polarization. It means that when both arguments equally strong or weak it lacks 
clarity for voters and they are looking for something else and “something” appears to be party 
endorsements. In conditions without a party endorsement when parties present opposite frames of 
the same strength, it cannot affect individuals’ opinions at all. But when polarization is high 
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partisans’ opinions move in the direction endorsed by their party even if the frame is weaker. So 
in this case party endorsement becomes more important than substantive information. 
Furthermore, in the polarized conditions “half-hearted evaluations of weak frames turned into 
enthusiastic evaluations if the frame received an endorsement by the individual’s party”. A 
polarized environment also enhances attitude importance. Citizens will be “less likely to consider 
alternative positions and more likely to take action based on their opinion”. Polarization influences 
how citizens evaluate substantive information and party cues, how the public views arguments. It 
shows that when “elites polarize on a given issue, citizens follow and polarize as well” (Druckman 
et al., 2013, 70-74). 
 
Other authors provide many arguments explaining why elite polarization should increase parties’ 
influence. When parties’ ideological positions are far from each other, it becomes easier for voters 
to determine the cues and where they stand (Zingher and Flynn, 2018, 23; Hetherington, 2001, 
628; Singer, 2016, 177). For example, at the time pro-integration consensus party positions 
influenced voters but the effect was limited (Ray, 2003, 979). Eurosceptic parties politicized the 
European integration conflict and without it voters would be “less likely to base their vote on EU 
attitudes” (Hernández and Kriesi, 2016, 517). After 1984 party positions affected voters more than 
socioeconomic factors (Ray, 2003, 988). Euroskeptic parties increased the impact of party cues as 
they made party messages more distinct (Ray, 2003, 991). 
 
According to some studies, nowadays voters are affected by their ideological orientation and by 
attitudes towards issues rather than traditional loyalties or stable social cleavages (Eatwell and 
Goodwin, 2018). It is why parties have to simplify ideological concepts to be heard, that decreases 
the cognitive cost of sophisticated electoral choice (Lachat, 2008, 687-688). The message becomes 
simpler when the system is polarized because actors discuss issues loudly in a conflict way (Adam 
et al., 2017, 266). Although it could lead to a decline in the civility of political debate (Layman, 
Carsey, and Horowitz, 2006, 101), it also can alleviate the lack of clarity for citizens (Brack 2015a, 
347). Furthermore, Geer found that when polarization is high, candidates focus more on 
opponents’ weaknesses, but “negative ads provide voters with more policy-based information than 
do positive ads”. Arguing candidates mention where their opponents are wrong, that, in fact, can 
make people more involved in politics (Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz 2006, 103).  
 
Elite polarization does not necessarily lead to issue polarization. Although the parties in the USA 
are polarized, many studies proved that across most issues Americans are ideologically moderate 
(Zingher and Flynn, 2018, 24). For example, the ideological distribution of voters can stay the 
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same but an individual’s policy orientations can “become a stronger predictor of their 
partisanship”. Zingher and Flynn call it sorting because voters sort into the right ideological camp 
(Zingher and Flynn, 2018, 24). 
 
The polarization is not constructed just within one for/against integration issue, it is constructed 
within a field of legitimating ideas (Statham and Trenz, 2013, 978), so parties become more 
ideological homogeneity about different issue dimensions (Zingher and Flynn, 2018, 23). It makes 
topics connected, that is called conflict extension. It increases mass consistency because voters 
learn “what goes with what”. This effect occurs whether an ordinal voter has strong ties to the 
party or not (Levendusky, 2010, 114-115). It might help voters to vote rationally, i.e. in accordance 
with their preferences. Some scholars think it is unlikely that citizens will become more 
consistently “in the absence of elite-level cues” because there are no other reasons why the person 
who supports tax cuts should oppose abortion rights as well. Politicians’ positions help citizens to 
“bring their attitudes on cross-cutting issue agendas into line with each other” (Layman, Carsey, 
and Horowitz 2006, 95). Some authors like Gelmen believe that effect of polarization on a voter 
coherency is at least limited, but Gelmen’s results based on over-time data that Levendusky finds 
not suitable to discovery a real causal relationship as many other factors can have an influence 
(2010).  
 
Many other authors support the idea that elite polarization helps citizens to choose parties that best 
represent them. Putting forward arguments parties should refer to both specific policies and the 
ideology, and when they differ on it, it becomes easier for voters to understand this connection, 
that is especially important in developing democracies where voters do not have enough 
knowledge to make a choice (Singer, 2016, 177). Zingher and Flynn found that as elite-level 
polarization increases, voters tend to more strongly identify themselves with the correct 
ideological party, and policy orientations have become a strong predictor of political behaviour. 
Increasing polarization has had the strongest effect on more moderate voters, who could not vote 
for the ideologically correct party. Also, more liberal citizens tend to self-identify as more extreme 
liberals, but self-identity of more conservative citizens did not change. It shows that the effect of 
polarization can be not symmetrical (Zingher and Flynn, 2018, 30-38). Analyzing time trend 
Zingher and Flynn to the conclusion that these changes in political behaviour and attitude on the 
mass level have been driven by the increasing polarization of elites (2018, 41). Cecilia Testa 
believes that as electoral stakes are growing up with polarization (2012), that should increase a 
voter’s motivation to make an accurate choice.  
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However, Rogowski claims that elite polarization does not lead to a more accurate choice because 
voters become less responsive to policy positions and more to salient political identities (2018,1-
2). When media cover elites’ debate, “partisan predispositions are activated in the minds of 
citizens”. It enhances partisans’ party identity and makes it less ambivalent, that will lead to 
increased partisan motivated reasoning. Motivated reasoning means that people tend to seek out 
information that confirms what they believe in. As a result, people rely more on partisan 
endorsements and less on substantive arguments (Druckman et al., 2013, 57-60). There are many 
examples of motivated reasoning in politics. For example, Democrats and Republicans in the USA 
differently evaluated the size of the national debt, inflation rates, and unemployment depending 
on who was in power (Cacciatore et al., 2014, 656).  
 
Cognitive-dissonance theory explains that it is psychologically uncomfortable for people “when 
discrepancies exist in their cognition”, so they prefer to avoid it (Cacciatore et al., 2014, 658). 
Greater elite ideological polarization produces “a more partisan information stream” 
(Hetherington, 2001, 623). Cacciatore et al. found that partisan audiences tend to selectively 
choose and interpret the news. As a result, “different segments of the population become 
fragmented and further entrenched in their points of view” that leads to mass polarization (2014, 
658-660). In the USA due to reinforcing partisan identities partisan out-groups is perceived 
increasingly negative and the political process became hostile and divided (Zingher and Flynn, 
2018, 24-25).  
 
To sum up, according to previous studies, elite polarization should enhance mass polarization. 
However, the effect is not always so straightforward. It is important that the speed and character 
of politicization of the EU, and polarization respectively, can differ across countries. Empirically 
it was proven by Grande and Kriesi. In their study, the salience varied from country to country 
significantly. Among the members states that the authors analyzed (Austria, France, Germany, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) the salience was highest in the United Kingdom 
and lowest in Germany (Grande and Kriesi, 2014, 198-199). Different factors can influence this 
process. To highlight the important factors for the study firstly the factors that influence the public 
opinion on European integration will be analyzed and then the factors that influence mass 
polarization. 
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2.4.The public opinion on European integration  
According to Vries analysis, member-states have either a clear majority of supporters or sceptics. 
Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Hungary, Ireland, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, and 
Spain have a majority of supporters. Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Great Britain, the 
Netherlands, and Sweden have a large share of sceptics (2018, 83-84). 
Scholars studying public opinion on European integration are not united about the factors that have 
an influence. Hooghe and Marks claim that the set of factors depends on an understanding of what 
the EU is. If the EU is perceived as a regime provoking economic exchange, citizens evaluate the 
costs and benefits for themselves and the country (2005, 420-421). For example, Vries believes 
that people compare the pros of their country being in the EU and the pros of being outside the 
EU. When the perceived benefits of being in the EU exceed the pros of being outside, people 
support the EU, and vice versa (Vries, 2018, 78). The degree of scepticism depends on the viability 
of an exit option. In this sense economic performance and quality of government (corruption) are 
especially important (Vries, 2018, 85). 
The adherents of the second approach see the EU as “a polity overarching established territorial 
communities”, in this sense the social identities of citizens should be taken into account (Hooghe 
and Marks, 2005, 420-421). Hooghe and Marks believe that national identity is important for 
understanding the public opinion, but found that the meaningful difference exists only between 
respondents with exclusive national identity and the rest (Hooghe and Marks 2005, 433). They 
also claimed that the effect of national identity means something if national elites are divided. So, 
in a context of exclusive national identity, the elite division will fuel negative opinion on European 
integration. When the elite is not divided, national identity will not play a big role or will be 
positively associated with the EU support (2005, 436).  
An alternative line of explanation conceives the European Union as “an extension of domestic 
politics” and this approach draws on the belief that public opinion is guided by domestic political 
organizations (Hooghe and Marks, 2005, 420-421). According to the cue theory, values and 
interests of citizens become politically salient because of the political actors. Although the level 
of involvement of different actors varies among different cases, the political parties are one of the 
main actors in the debate on European integration (Grande and Kriesi, 2014, 212). Of course, 
parties are no longer the exclusive actors in this regard, as social movements, interest groups, and 
media also play a role in expressing contestation. However, for the “authoritative allocation of 
values and public policy” of all actors involved in mobilizing depend on parties (Van Der Eijk and 
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Franklin, 2004, 40-41). Interestingly, there is no correlation between EU knowledge and support 
for European integration, and only limited connections between cue-taking and support for 
European integration (Hobolt, 2007, 169). 
As different explanations lines exist, the parties use different frames to represent their attitude to 
European integration. Cultural frames are related to identity and, for example, a party, that 
negatively frame a cultural aspect of the European integration, will stress the importance of 
cultural homogeneity and national boundaries. Economic frames are connected with economic 
prosperity, labour and social security. When the party positively frames the economic aspects of 
the EU it will stress the role of the EU in economic prosperity and labour security rights. Also, 
other frames exist such as security, ecology and political efficiency (Vasilopoulou, 2018, 317). In 
times of the crisis, parties can intensify the frames related to the nature of the crisis (Vasilopoulou, 
2018, 317).  
Ray, referencing Eichenberg and Dalton, claims that campaigns, elite actions, and the international 
environment can influence public opinion on the EU (Ray, 2003, 979), but it is still under-
researched how public opinion is formed in a multi-layered system. Grande and Kriesi studying 
newspapers content found that international and supranational arenas contribute to the national 
debates on the EU. Supranational actors account for 27.7 per cent of core sentences, national 
executives from other countries for 38.5 per cent and national executives only for 10.9 per cent. 
The picture is similar in regards to political parties. It shows a high degree of both vertical and 
horizontal Europeanization (Grande and Kriesi, 2014, 213-214). 
Vertical Europeanization means that the EU level can influence the national one. Horizontal 
Europeanization means that a more polarized party system in one country can lead to greater 
voters’ polarization in another. There are some arguments in favour of this position in literature. 
Cees van der Eijk and Mark N. Franklin claimed the if the EU integration becomes politicized in 
one country, the other countries will be contaminated (Van Der Eijk and Franklin, 2004, 49). 
Furthermore, at the time of the euro crisis, Germany significantly contributed to the debate in other 
member states (Grande and Kriesi, 2014, 213-214). However, it seems that the different countries 
have different capacity to influence the debate due to the different factors like geographical 
proximity, political affinity or weight. Pieter De Wilde and Michael Zurn claim that increasing 
polarization in France and Germany may influence the political climate more than other countries 
due to the status of the motor behind integration (2012, 149). Nevertheless, the most relevant cues 
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about European integration arise at the national level, in other words, by domestic actors (Hooghe 
and Marks, 2005, 424-425). The national level should be of paramount importance.  
Down and Wilson prove that even in the EU case, where the level of support is generally rather 
high, bimodality in the distribution of attitudes can exist. Even if the distribution is not bimodal, 
public opinion can become more polarized over time and it is an important trend to study (2008, 
30). 
 
2.5. Factors influencing mass polarization 
2.5.1. The salience of the issue, Eurosceptic parties, party size 
Down and Wilson tested what factors or set of factors can explain why elite polarization causes 
public polarization in some countries and does not in other. Firstly, they have come to believe that 
theoretically even if parties’ stances on the EU are polarized but the salience of the issue is low, it 
“may play little part in structuring public opinion” (Down and Wilson, 2010). The salience of the 
different issues indeed varies among parties. According to the “saliency theory”, political parties 
focus on the issues supported by a majority of the electorate and ignore other questions (Ray, 2003, 
980). Ray proved it statistically but also found that since all parties address issues of European 
integration after 1992, the strength of the factor was mitigated (2003, 988). Adam et al. found that 
pro-European parties “attach salience to the topic of EU integration” as Eurosceptic parties do. 
However, it is also true that pro-European catch-all internally dissent parties choose to decrease 
salience of the issue (Adam et al., 2017, 277). S. Adam et al. show that the right-wing Euroskeptic 
fringe parties address the EU polity issues more than others during the EP elections: “60% of EU 
issue mobilization by radical right-wing parties refer to polity issues”. (Adam et al., 2013, 88-89). 
Non-Euroskeptic parties in general focus on policy issues (Adam et al., 2013, 94-95). Opposition 
to the EU polity means opposition to “the EU project as a whole” (Mair, 2007, 3). 
  
Secondly, the public support for Eurosceptic parties should reach a certain threshold as in this case 
it would be difficult for the mainstream parties to ignore this topic (Down and Wilson, 2010). 
Mainstream parties may indeed have a temptation to avoid such topics. Putting the EU issues on 
the agenda Eurosceptics challenge the mainstream parties, especially if the parties internally 
dissent on the EU (Adam et al., 2017, 262). It is also important to note that if party is divided on 
the issue, its’ capacity to build public opinion will be lower. The contradictory messages will blur 
the cues and supporters will not get it (Ray, 2003, 980-981). Adam et al. formulated three strategic 
options that pro-EU parties have in such situation: 1) defend a pro-EU position; 2) adopt more 
critical position; 3) blur their position (Adam et al., 2017, 263). As party’s agenda influences 
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agenda of other parties, it can be expected that mainstream parties will be influenced by 
Eurosceptic ones. It was proved statistically that in the countries where parties most harshly 
criticize the EU, like the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK, non-Euroskeptic parties demonstrate 
the strongest support for the EU (Adam et al., 2013, 93-94). It can be important that Euroskeptic 
parties criticize the EU in a moderate way (–.21), while non-Euroskeptic parties are rather neutral 
(.05) (Adam et al., 2013, 93). 
 
Also, the location of such parties on the left-right axis may affect public division. If Eurosceptic 
parties present on both the left and the right side of the scale, the probability that they will get 
voters also on both sides increases (Down and Wilson, 2010, 77-80). Hernández and Kriesi also 
proved that Eurosceptic partisan offer influences this process (2016, 521). 
  
Finally, party size can influence the public division. Theoretically, the level of congruence between 
voters and parties will be higher in countries with many small parties (Down and Wilson, 2010). 
At the same time studying polarization in a multi-party system can be a more challenging task than 
studying it in a two-party system (Thomsen, 2014, 786.). 
 
Using binary indicators, Down and Wilson found that in different countries deferent set of 
conditions lead to the public division. So public division is high when the median party size is 
small and  
1) The salience is low, but there are Eurosceptic parties on the left and the right or high Eurosceptic 
party support or  
2) there is low Eurosceptic party support, but the salience of the EU is high. 
If the median party size is large, it requires the high salience, the low level of support and an 
absence of Eurosceptic parties on the left and the right. So, in five of six cases, the inter-party 
competition causes the public division when parties are small plus at least one causal factor (Down 
and Wilson, 2010, 77-80). 
 
2.5.2. Personal characteristics 
According to the theory strength of ideology and partisanship, education, age, gender and race 
may influence how likely citizens will see the differences between the parties, but in 
Hetherington’s study, which covered data since 1960 until 1996 in the USA, only education turned 
out to be the significant factor (Hetherington, 2001, 626-628).  
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Some authors claim that although polarization can help to build an opinion about politics, the effect 
is limited by party’ affiliation and political awareness (Layman and Carsey, 2002; Ray 2003, 981). 
Elite polarization should affect mainly citizens with strong partisan ties and who know where their 
party stands on the issue (Rogowski, 2018, 5). Although Down and Wilson claim that even not 
adherents of the party are influenced by a change of parties’ stance. When a party moves from a 
centre and offers a new choice to voters, they get the message and this new stance becomes the 
part of their beliefs. Since a party provides a new choice it may resonate with the wider public 
(2010, 67).  
 
To interpret partisan cues on the European dimension correctly the higher level of knowledge is 
needed. Hobolt found that voters, which are ignorant about political affairs, were more likely to 
think that the ideological gap between them and parties are smaller than it was on the EU 
dimension, although such effect was not observed on the left-right dimension (2007, 168). Only if 
voters know party positions on the EU, voters can act relying on the endorsements (Hobolt, 2007, 
175). 
 
2.5.3. Time 
Although it is still the subject of debate, some believe that politicization can be not a linear process 
(De Wilde and Zürn, 2012, 140). For example, in 1992 in the EU variance in public attitude raised, 
but it “did not initiate a new trend of increasing dissensus” after and the dispersion of public 
attitude in member states did not significantly change since 1992 to 2002 (Down and Wilson, 
2008, 40). Furthermore, over the long run the changes in the level of consensus are not so 
significant (Down and Wilson, 2008, 46). Other authors support these findings. Grande and Kriesi 
showed that the salience of the EU integration increased since the 1970s in all countries, but in 
comparison with 1990s it declined in the 2000s (2014, 198-199). 
 
Polarization as a part of the politicization process also can have peaks and recession but scientists 
found that polarization on the EU tends to increase over time (Grande and Kriesi, 2014, 283). 
Zingher and Flynn mentioned that polarization trends positively over time, it is why it is highly 
correlated with time trend and other positively trended variables. However, the changes have to 
be constant for a linear trend, but not the variation in the change in polarization (2018, 40). Also, 
public opinion doesn’t always respond to a change in parties’ positions immediately 
(Hetherington, 2001, 626). 
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2.5.4. Opportunity structure 
It is why many believe that polarization isn’t consistently increasing but increasing in times of 
special moments like major treaty negotiations and crisis. According to study analyzing the 
politicization of the EU, the Maastricht Treaty, the constitutional process, the Lisbon Treaty and 
conflicts over Turkey’s EU membership caused the highest levels of politicization in the period 
since 1970 and until 2012 in the sample of six countries of the EU (Grande and Kriesi, 2014, 106).  
 
The crises of various types, such as geopolitical or economic crises, contribute to creating 
institutional opportunities for the politicization of the EU (De Wilde and Zürn, 2012, 145). 
Especially important in this sense are crises at the EU level because it provokes debate about the 
EU and elites become highly polarized over the EU (Vasilopoulou, 2018, 312). The euro crisis 
increased the salience of the European integration issues and as a consequence, the political parties 
developed more differentiated positions on it (Grande and Kriesi, 2014, 217). Vries in her book 
mentions that “existing differences in public opinion hardened and became more pronounced 
during the crisis” (2018, 89). Other scholars also demonstrated that the crisis increased the 
importance of the pro-/anti-EU dimension (Otjes and van der Veer, 2016).  
 
The EU crisis can influence the political agenda even if the country did not suffer from the crisis 
significantly. The euro crisis is an illustration of it. The euro crisis debate was a European, highly 
visible and took all over the EU. The politicization of the euro crisis was constrained but it led to 
the Europeanisation of the political debate. The euro crisis caused extremely salient debates and 
led “to the increased visibility of Europe in the politics of the European nation states” (Grande and 
Kriesi, 2014, 273). The tension of the conflict was not high only in countries that were hardest hit 
by the crisis. For example, the crisis caused a high level of politicization in Germany (Grande and 
Kriesi, 2014, 276). The euro crisis debate took place even in non-member of Eurozone countries, 
although there the debates were less lively (Grande and Kriesi, 2014, 273). 
 
Vasilopoulou supposes that during the crisis mainstream and challenger parties will behave 
differently. Mainstream parties tend to stick to the positive EU position but increase the salience 
of these issues, while challenger parties tend to stress their Eurosceptic positions in times of 
political or economic instability. However, when challenger parties get into government, they tend 
to mitigate their Eurosceptic position (Vasilopoulou, 2018, 312).  
 
Another factor that may have an influence is elections. According to Hetherington, in off-year 
elections, people pay less attention to politics so they may pay less attention to the differences 
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between parties as well. Although if the government is divided, the differences in parties’ positions 
will be seen, on the other hand, it would be more difficult for people to understand whether the 
government is ideologically driving (Hetherington, 2001, 626). Time of accession is quite 
important in this sense as well. Down and Wilson claim after the accession public debates on the 
merits of membership become less tense as the decision-making process become more technical 
(2008, 36). 
 
Grande and Hutter call referendums «the ideal opportunity structures for politicising European 
integration issues» (2016, 289). In their study the cases with a national referendum demonstrated 
a high-intensity mass conflict. The referendum leads to a higher polarization over Europe and 
involvement of non-governmental actors (2016, 77). Grande and Hutter claim that national 
referendums lead to strong politicization due to five factors:  
•  Voters choose between different positions in referendums, rather than parties, and their 
choice is more concerned with issues outcomes than elections.  
• The European issues compete with other political in elections, while in referendums parties 
focus only on European issues. 
• The referendum gives «dissenting voices better opportunities to articulate themselves».  
• Parties have more freedom in framing issues in referendums.  
• Referendums have the own momentum and «it is more difficult for mainstream parties to 
control their courses and outcomes» (2016, 288-289). 
 
Other factors creating an opportunity structure and provoking politicization include different 
national narratives about European integration, competitive party politics and media attention for 
EU issue that has grown over time but differ across countries. De Wilde and Zürn call it 
intermediating factors because they lie somewhere between the real cause the of politicization and 
the process itself, but are essential to launch politicization process (2012, 138-139). Statham and 
Trenz also believe that institutional opportunities for influencing the decision and high media 
attention are important for politicization (2013, 977).  
 
2.6.Summary and directional expectations 
To sum up the following factors can influence mass polarization: 
• The salience of the issue 
• Eurosceptic party support and the location of Eurosceptic parties on the left–right axis 
• Party size and party system 
• Ideological coherence of the parties 
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• Personal characteristics: political awareness, strength of ideology and partisan ties 
• Major treaty negotiations, crisis, elections, time of accession 
• Media attention 
 
According to the theory, the following directional expectations are formulated: 
1) The high salience of European integration in the party’s public stance should provoke public 
opinion polarization. 
2) The sufficient electoral support of Eurosceptic parties should provoke public opinion polarization. 
3) The presence of Eurosceptic parties on both sides of the left–right axis should provoke public 
opinion polarization. 
4) The effect of party size is indistinct. The small median party size should provoke polarization but 
at the same time polarization can be higher in the two-party system. 
5) Higher political awareness should provoke public opinion polarization. 
6) The EU crisis creates the opportunity structure that should provoke public opinion polarization. 
7) Low media salience of the EU issues should prevent public opinion polarization. 
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3. Methodological chapter 
3.1.Cases selection 
3.1.1. Mass polarization 
The dependent variable of the study is the polarization of public opinion about the EU. The 
dependent variable is operationalized as the standard deviation of the opinion about the EU 
because it is similar to as Dalton's measure of polarization. For the public opinion about the EU 
Standard Eurobarometer reports are used.  
 
For each survey independent samples are drawn. The basic sampling design is a multi-stage, 
random design. The regular sample size is 1000 respondents per country, with the exception of 
small countries like Luxembourg or Malta (Sampling and Fieldwork, n.d). Separate samples are 
drawn for Northern Ireland and Great Britain and for West-Germany and East-Germany during 
the period that is studied (Population, countries & regions, n.d.). The results are combined for the 
comparability of data. 
  
Since 2000 the question about the image of the EU is present in the questionnaire. Respondents 
are asked: “In general, does the EU conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, 
fairly negative or very negative image?” Answer categories: 1 "Very positive", 2 "Fairly positive", 
3 "Neutral", 4 "Fairly negative", 5 "Very negative", 6 "DK". The number of the question has 
changed from year to year: QA9, QA10, QA11, QA12, QA13, QA14, QA15, D78. 
 
3.1.2. Elite polarization 
For elite polarization Dalton’s index is used (Dalton, 2008): 
 𝑃𝐼 = 𝑆𝑄𝑅𝑇{Σ(𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦	𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒	𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝒾)× ([𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝐿 𝑅⁄ 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝒾	– 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦	𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚	𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒	 𝐿 𝑅⁄ 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒] ∕ 5)C} 
 
This scale is from 0, which means that all parties occupy the same position, to 10, which means 
that all the parties are split between the two extremes of the scale. This index reflects both party 
position and vote share or, in other words, party size, that is valuable according to the theory 
(Down and Wilson, 2010). Since Dalton believes that parties’ polarization and parties’ 
fragmentation should not always be connected, this index does not depend on a number of parties, 
that is a clear advantage (Dalton, 2008). However, 1 to 10 ideological scale is used in Dalton’s 
study, while Chapel Hill surveys data, which is used in this study, use 1-7 scale to estimate the 
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ideological positions of parties. Dalton divides by 5 to rescale the measure, so that it would run 
from 0 to a theoretical maximum of 10. Since it is not applicable in this case, this dividing will not 
be applied in this study: 
 𝑃𝐼 = 𝑆𝑄𝑅𝑇{Σ(𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦	𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒	𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝒾)× ([𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝐿 𝑅⁄ 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝒾	– 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦	𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚	𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒	 𝐿 𝑅⁄ 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒])C} 
 
For the index it is necessary to know where parties stand on the pro-/anti-EU scale. There are 
several ways to estimate parties’ positions: 1) the content analysis of manifestos; 2) voter surveys; 
3) expert surveys. 
 
Several famous databases are based on the content analysis of manifestos. First of all, there is 
Euromanifesto study of European Election Studies and Manifesto Project. Some authors, such as 
Andrews and Money (2009) and Budge and McDonald (2006), used this approach. However, there 
is debate about the validity of this approach, because it focuses more on salience than on positions 
(Dalton 2008, 904).  
 
Another way is to ask voters to define parties’ positions. The Comparative Study of Electoral 
Systems (CSES), European Social Survey European Election Study can be used for this approach. 
The disadvantage is that voter’s position can be interconnected with parties’ positions or they can 
just do not know where a party stand but be ashamed to say it. Also, Adams, L. Ezrow and Z. 
Somer-Topcu found that voters do not recognize when parties changes their manifestos (2011). 
 
As a result, the experts surveys will be used in this study. The Chapel Hill expert surveys estimate 
party positioning on European integration based on national elections. They have data from 1999 
until 2017. They estimate overall orientation of the party leadership towards European integration. 
They use a 1 to 7 scale where 1 is strongly opposed, 2 is opposed, 3 is somewhat opposed, 4 is 
neutral, 5 is somewhat in favor, 6 is in favor and 7 is strongly in favor. The Chapel Hill database 
also consists of latest national elections results, which is needed for Dalton’s polarization index. 
It makes the data cleaner and more sustainable. In several cases the position of the parties was not 
estimated precisely: In Denmark in 2011 RV was estimated as strongly in favor, in Greece in 2009 
KKE was estimated as strongly opposed, in the UK in 2010 UKIP was estimated as strongly 
opposed, in Portugal 2009 PS was estimated as strongly in favor, in Bulgaria in 2009 L was 
estimated as neutral, in Poland in 2011 PR was estimated as neutral, in Croatia in 2011 HNS was 
estimated as strongly in favor, in Malta in 2013 PN was estimated as strongly in favor, in 
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Luxemburg in 2013 CSV was estimated as strongly in favor. For all these cases these estimations 
were replaced by the corresponding figure defined in the codebook. 
 
3.1.3. The sample of the study 
For the analysis the national elections results since 2008 until 2017 was used. It is justified for 
theoretical reasons and data availability. Since 2008 there were many events that, according to the 
theory (De Wilde and Zürn, 2012, 138-139), should create the opportunity structure for 
polarization: the Lisbon treaty negotiations, the European debt crisis, the European migrant crisis, 
the Brexit. These events should force parties to address the EU agenda during the electoral 
campaign in national elections. In these conditions politicization of the EU should increase and 
polarization, as a part of this process, should increase as well. The national elections were covered 
only until 2017 because the latest available Chapel Hill expert survey was carried out in January 
and February 2018.  
 
In this study the elite polarization on the EU dimension was analyzed in time of national elections. 
The elections can create the opportunity structure for parties to polarize public opinion. In the year 
of elections people pay more attention to politics and the differences between parties respectively 
(Hetherington, 2001, 626). 
 
The national elections and not the European Parliament elections were used due to the several 
reasons. First of all, the European parliament elections are specific. Still due to the lower stakes, 
protest voting and proportional electoral system small and more radical parties get more seats than 
they get in national elections (Dinas and Riera, 2018). It would influence the polarization index 
significantly.  
 
The EP elections for the long time were not important. Shortly after the first Parliament elections, 
Relf and Schmit named them second-order elections, that means that voters wanted to influence 
their government not the EU politics (1980, 8-9). The parties at the EP elections didn’t compete 
to offer voters a different vision of the EU future (Ferrara, Weishaupt, 2004, 285). Neither the 
degree of attention to EU issues, nor the position about integration were statistically significant 
factors defining the electoral success of a party (Ferrara, Weishaupt, 2004, 299). Till Weber drew 
attention to the fact that the parties deliberately avoided integration issues as traditional support 
for the major parties is determined by the left-right dimension (Weber, 2007, 509).  
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The election campaigns in the EP elections used to be unspectacular as parties spend significantly 
less money, time and attention, media also pay less attention, so turnout was low (Tenscher, 2013). 
Some believe that the EP elections have become even more secondary (Hix, Hagemann, 2009, 
39). Of course, the nature of political competition between political groups in the EP have changed 
over time and it became more competitive. There used to be a grand coalition of the two main 
parties, but the relations became more competitive and now look like the classical left-right 
opposition (Hix, Kreppel, 2003, 81-85). The leading academics claim that the last European 
Parliament elections of 2019 were more political, less second order and Europe was on the agenda, 
although not always at the core of the campaign (Molder, 2019).  
 
At the same time, national political arena is still of paramount importance. According to Hooghe 
and Marks, the most relevant cues about European integration arise at national level by domestic 
actors (2005, 424-425). Being in the European Parliament deputes do not always choose to actively 
communicate with electorate and spend time “in their domestic base, rather than concentrating 
solely or mainly on work inside the EP” (Farrell and Scully, 2010, 39). It means that parties ties 
with these representatives will be weaker so their ability to influence mass polarization will be 
lower as well (Rogowski, 2018, 5).  
 
It is theoretically justified to choose the national elections for the analysis. The disadvantage of 
this approach is that countries use different electoral systems for national elections. As it was 
mentioned studying polarization in a multi-party system can be a more challenging task than 
studying it in a two-party system (Thomsen, 2014, 786.). As Dalton’s index include the party size, 
the systems that favors big parties, like majoritarian systems, likely will be more polarized. It will 
be controlled for effective number of parties to compensate for it. 
 
There were 56 national elections in the EU since 2008 until 2017 analyzed by Chapel Hill expert 
survey. Using Dalton’s index and the standard deviation elite polarization was counted for all these 
cases. Then the mass polarization in about 6 months since the national elections was analyzed. 
During the electoral campaign parties should actively debate on the issue and people should pay 
more attention to politics (Hetherington, 2001, 626). However, public opinion doesn’t always 
respond to a change in parties’ positions immediately (Hetherington, 2001, 626). It is why the 
lagged variable was used in this study. Standard Eurobarometer reports are published twice per 
year, usually in November and May. The survey reports, that were published more than 4 months 
since elections but less than 9, were used to get comparable results. 
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Table 1. Mass and elite polarization 
Country Year of elections Elite polarization Mass polarization 
Austria 2008 1.749264 0.9459587 
Austria 2013 1.965645 1.0720552 
Belgium 2010 1.127717 0.8271954 
Belgium 2014 1.092411 0.8845412 
Bulgaria 2009 1.342121 0.8973498 
Bulgaria 2014 1.456959 1.0367709 
Croatia 2011 0.8129497 1.0306895 
Cyprus 2011 0.926058 0.8871260 
Czech Republic 2010 1.423052 0.8860814 
Czech Republic 2013 1.689057 0.9586612 
Czech Republic 2017 1.633397 1.0374165 
Denmark 2011 1.70617 0.8458469 
Estonia 2011 0.7468371 0.6736437 
Estonia 2015 1.099055 0.7347840 
Finland 2011 1.735907 0.7525388 
France 2012 1.633009 0.9846930 
France 2017 2.206457 1.0270492 
Germany 2009 0.8944968 0.9397012 
Germany 2013 1.770446 0.8615333 
Germany 2017 1.574712 0.9364502 
Greece 2009 1.898882 0.9397012 
Greece 2012 2.134811 1.0393730 
Greece 2015 1.853105 1.0116651 
Hungary 2010 1.385202 0.8450026 
Hungary 2014 3.003052 0.8861059 
Ireland 2011 1.486502 0.9534218 
Italy 2008 1.171702 0.8916299 
Italy 2013 2.749301 0.9397547 
Latvia 2011 1.248827 0.7395733 
Latvia 2014 1.072193 0.7615357 
Lithuania 2008 0.9094111 0.7332636 
Lithuania 2012 1.261628 0.7351845 
Luxembourg 2013 1.32268 0.9644474 
Malta 2013 0.6933182 0.8675133 
Netherlands 2010 1.639662 0.8277448 
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Netherlands 2012 1.703677 0.9228890 
Netherlands 2017 1.859289 0.9051476 
Poland 2011 1.409564 0.7759403 
Poland 2015 1.913103 0.9022235 
Portugal 2009 1.576418 0.8849238 
Portugal 2011 1.833848 0.8663537 
Portugal 2015 1.77789 0.9230655 
Romania 2008 0.6322588 0.8312896 
Romania 2012 0.6800588 0.9199309 
Slovakia 2010 0.7679206 0.7889340 
Slovakia 2012 1.42414 0.9296458 
Slovakia 2016 1.485258 0.9013590 
Slovenia 2008 1.00578 0.7734659 
Slovenia 2014 0.6830602 0.8754835 
Spain 2011 0.8660779 0.9379098 
Spain 2016 0.8444841 0.8380383 
Spain 2008 0.7529906 0.7890171 
Sweden 2010 1.682971 0.8824934 
Sweden 2014 1.739977 0.8824941 
UK 2010 2.399051 0.9896201 
UK 2017 1.795432 1.2481904 
 
According to the theory, elite polarization should cause mass polarization. For this paper it was 
decided to look at cases with high elite polarization and check if the mass polarization is high in 
these cases as well. Since the Dalton’s index of elite polarization was changed, 0 does not show 
low polarization anymore and 10 is not and an indicator of high polarization. In this case the 
threshold cannot be determined and what is the high and low elite polarization will be defined in 
comparison with each other. The same approach is valid for mass polarization. As a result, 12 
cases with highest elite polarization were chosen. 
 
Table 2. Selected cases 
Country Year of elections Elite polarization Mass polarization 
Hungary 2014 3.003052 0.8861059 
Italy 2013 2.749301 0.9397547 
UK 2010 2.399051 0.9896201 
France 2017 2.206457 1.0270492 
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Greece 2012 2.134811 1.0393730 
Austria 2013 1.965645 1.0720552 
Poland 2015 1.913103 0.9022235 
Greece 2009 1.898882 0.9397012 
Netherlands 2017 1.859289 0.9051476 
Greece 2015 1.853105 1.0116651 
Portugal 2011 1.833848 0.8663537 
UK 2017 1.795432 1.2481904 
 
In this sample of 12 cases, in 5 cases public opinion is polarized as well: France in 2017, Greece 
in 2012, Austria in 2013, Greece in 2015 and the UK in 2017. In the remaining 7 cases elites are 
polarized but public opinion is not: Hungary in 2014, Italy in 2013, the UK in 2010, Poland in 
2015, Greece in 2009, the Netherlands in 2017, Portugal in 2011. 
 
3.2.Research design 
The dependent variable of this study is mass polarization and the independent variable of this study 
is elite polarization. According to the theory, elite polarization should cause mass polarization 
(Down and Wilson, 2010; Ray, 2003; Hooghe and Marks, 2005) but as it was showed in the 
literature review it is not a linear process. Many factors intervene and influence how elite 
polarization affects mass polarization. To determine what factors explain the variation of the 
dependent variable Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) is used in this study. The QCA is 
used when the same factors lead to different outcomes. QCA is especially useful for causal 
interpretation, which is supposed to be done in this research.  
The sample of this study is too small for meaningful statistical tests. Even 56 cases are too small 
sample for complex statistical models and will impose many restrictions. In the end 12 cases with 
varying dependent variable were chosen and it is too big sample for comparative case studies. 
QCA is designed for studying mid-sized datasets about 10-50 cases. It is a good solution in the 
case of this study. 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis was used by Down and Wilson to define what set of conditions 
lead to the public division in different countries (2010). The approached used by famous experts 
was borrowed in this study as well. However, in contrast to Down and Wilson the different set of 
factors used in this study, some the factors are operationalized in different ways, and are tested in 
different time line and different cases. Down and Wilson analyzed 11 countries (Belgium, 
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Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and 
Spain) for the years 1988, 1992, 1996, 1999 and 2002 (2010, 73). Although, it is an important 
research, the politicization of the EU has increased significantly since 2008 (Grande and Kriesi, 
2014), some factors like the presence of Eurosceptic parties also changed (Brack, 2015b), since 
the ‘90s the salience of the topic increased and now all parties address issues of European 
integration (Ray, 2003, 988). What is more important since 2008 there was a series of crisis in the 
EU that theoretically should force national parties to include the EU dimension in their national 
agenda. It is important to see what factors lead to mass polarization in these new circumstances. 
 
3.2.1. QCA 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis is both a data analysis technic and a research approach. 
Collection and re-collection of data, definition and re-definition of the criteria, dropping and 
adding cases, calibrating and recalibrating sets, adding and dropping conditions is the normal and 
important part of the research (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, 11). Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis can be applied by computer software. In this analysis R software environment was 
chosen.  
Qualitative Comparative Analysis produces all possible combinations of conditions that lead to 
the outcome, identifying the sufficient and necessary conditions. Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis uses the logical operators OR (+) and AND (*). QCA addresses the principles of logical 
minimization. It is “a process by which the empirical information is expressed in a more 
parsimonious yet logically equivalent manner by looking for commonalities and differences 
among cases that share the same outcome” (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, 9). As a final result, 
the shortest set of factors that imply the outcome will be found. 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis is set-theoretic method. All set-theoretic methods are applied to 
analyze social reality when relations between social phenomena are perceived as set relations and 
when there is causal complexity. The set relations are interpreted not in a causal or a descriptive 
manner but in terms of sufficient, necessary conditions or of more complex configuration like 
Insufficient but Necessary part of a condition (INUS) and Sufficient but Unnecessary part of a 
factor (SUIN) (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, 3-6). In the case of mass polarization when other 
studies highlighted many different factors this method has significant analytical potential. Elite 
polarization can cause mass polarization under different circumstances, so not the only one set of 
factors can lead to a positive outcome and they can work in combination rather than in isolation. 
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According to Schneider and Wagemann, Qualitative Comparative Analysis is the most formalized 
and complete method from all set-theoretic methods (2012, 9). 
There is a classic confrontation between adherents of quantitative and qualitative methods, but 
QCA can be perceived as a third way or hybrid method (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, 10). 
QCA has some advantages over the qualitative methods and quantitative methods. It has a more 
formalized and systematic character. However, using QCA multi-collinearity, heteroskedasticity 
and unit homogeneity will be avoided, which is often a problem for the statistical tests. It also 
allows to visualize and analyze causal complexity using truth tables (Schneider and Wagemann, 
2012, 9).  
In this paper crisp-set QCA (csQCA) will be used. Crisp-set QCA works with binary variables: 
the score is either 0 or 1. The disadvantage of this type of QCA is that it does not have gradations, 
so this black or white approach does not always reflect reality. Сalibration involves an element of 
subjectivity as the research sets the threshold defining what is negative (0) and positive (1) result 
in this case. It can be partly eliminated if the operationalization of the variables is based on solid 
theoretical assumptions.  
Two main parameters that evaluate the solution are consistency and coverage. Consistency 
indicates how much one set is included by another, that demonstrate if the configuration is 
consistent with the underlying theoretical assumptions. Sometimes it is called inclusion (Thiem 
and Duşa, 2013, 89). The closer consistency is to 1, the better, but it should not be below 0.75 for 
sufficiency and should not be below 0.9 for necessity. Coverage shows how well the data is 
explained by the conditions. “For sufficient conditions, raw coverage indicates how much a single 
path covers, while unique coverage indicates how much it uniquely covers. For necessary 
conditions, coverage expresses their relevance in terms of not being much larger than the outcome, 
and the Relevance of Necessity (RoN), in terms of the condition being close to a constant” 
(Hinterleitner et al., 2016, 556). The closer it is to 1, the better. However, in contrast to consistency, 
the low coverage does not mean that the results are irrelevant. As Roig-Tierno et al. claim 
configuration that has low coverage can be still useful “to explain a set which causes a particular 
outcome” (2017, 17). 
It was decided to use an intermediate solution for this study. The three main option exist: 
conservative solution, the most parsimonious solution and the intermediate solution. The 
difference between them is that the conservative solution is not based on logical remainders, while 
the most parsimonious solution is based on simplifying assumptions. The intermediate solution, 
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in turn, is “a subset of the most parsimonious solution and a superset of the conservative solution, 
a direct result of the requirement that easy counterfactuals are a subset of all simplifying 
assumptions”. While the interpretation of conservative solution term is often too complex, the 
interpretation of the most parsimonious solution term can contradict the theory. In a sense of 
complexity, the intermediate solution is in between the conservative and the most parsimonious 
solutions and help to find a balance (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, 175). 
 
3.2.2. Process tracing  
Qualitative Comparative Analysis will be the first phase of the study. The goal of this phase is to 
determine the set of conditions that lead to polarized public opinion about the EU when the elite 
is polarized. After this when the appropriate set of conditions will be found the case analysis can 
be done. The case analysis is needed to study typical and deviant cases or to get more information 
about how these cases look like and how these sets of conditions work in practice.  
 
The case of Greece is interested for process tracing analysis because it allows tracing how the 
factors caused public opinion polarization about the EU. In Greece, the elite had been polarized 
already in 2009, but the public opinion had not been polarized in 2009 yet. Although public opinion 
became polarized about the EU in 2012 and 2015.  
 
The process tracing method will help to unfold the mass polarization process over time. Collier 
defines process tracing “as the systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and 
analyzed in light of research questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator” (Collier, 2011, 
823). Process tracing is a suitable analytic tool for describing phenomena but also for evaluating 
causal claims. Process tracing can contribute when there is a need to evaluate prior hypotheses and 
produce new hypotheses, to assess causal claims as well as gain an insight into causal mechanisms 
(Collier, 2011, 824). The results of Qualitative Comparative Analysis will be supplemented by 
within-case analysis as it will help to look more closely at the factors’ influence on the public 
opinion polarization about the EU. Process tracing will add leverage in the analysis and increases 
its explanatory value. 
 
To determine diagnostic pieces of evidence, process tracing requires prior knowledge such as 
conceptional framework, recurring empirical regularities, etc. In this study after theory review and 
the Qualitative Comparative Analysis the factors will be formulated and can be used for process 
tracing. For purposes of this study simplified version of process tracing will be used. The 
approached will be used without testing of the hypothesis such as straw-in-the-wind, hoop, 
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smoking-gun, and doubly decisive (Collier, 2011, 825). These elements of process tracing help to 
make the research more objective and systematized but they are not necessary. 
 
3.3.Operationalization and calibration 
According to the theory there are different factors that can influence the ability of polarized parties 
to influence mass polarization and public opinion about the EU. 
 
3.3.1. Eurosceptic support 
According to the theory, pro-European parties may choose to decrease salience of the EU issues, 
while Eurosceptic parties tend to address these issues loudly (Adam et al., 2017). When the public 
support for Eurosceptic parties reach a certain threshold, it became difficult for the mainstream 
parties to ignore this topic (Down and Wilson, 2010).  
 
To determine what parties are Eurosceptics the Chapel Hill expert survey’s estimations were used. 
They use 1 to 7 point scale: 1 is strongly opposed, 2 is opposed, 3 is somewhat opposed, 4 is 
neutral, 5 is somewhat in favour, 6 is in favour, 7 is strongly in favour. In this scale from 1 to 3 
points correspond to Eurosceptic positions but for determining real Eurosceptic parties only 1 and 
2 points should be used. The same approach was used by Sydow (2013, 87). 
 
Following Down and Wilson’s approach, the Eurosceptic support variable is operationalized as 
the sum of the average vote share for Eurosceptic parties in each country. Down and Wilson 
divided the countries from their sample into two groups: in one group the Eurosceptic vote share 
was high, in another the Eurosceptic vote share was low (Down and Wilson, 2010, 77). In this 
study for calibration the threshold of 10 per cent of votes was used. First of all, the chance that in 
all these cases Eurosceptic support is high should not be excluded so dividing these cases into two 
groups based on the comparison to each other might be not right. Setting the independent threshold 
is more objective and valid. Sydow defined the EU dimension is politicized in the country-member 
of the EU if the support for Eurosceptic parties above than 10 per cent (Sydow, 2013, 133-135). 
Due to these reasons, the threshold of 10 per cent of votes was used. If the support for Eurosceptic 
parties in a country was equal or more than 10 per cent the case was marked with 1, if less it was 
marked with 0. In the sample of this study, Austria in 2013, France in 2017, Greece in 2009, Greece 
in 2012, Greece in 2015, Hungary in 2014, Italy in 2013, the Netherlands in 2017, the UK in 2010 
and the UK in 2017 were marked with 1. And Poland in 2015 and Portugal in 2011 were marked 
with 0. 
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3.3.2. The presence of both right and left Eurosceptic parties 
According to the theory, the location of such parties on the left-right axis may affect public 
division. If Eurosceptic parties present on both the left and the right side of the scale, the 
probability that they will get voters also on both sides increases (Down and Wilson, 2010, 77-80; 
Hernández and Kriesi, 2016, 521).  
 
To define the location of Eurosceptic parties on the left-right axis the Chapel Hill expert survey’s 
estimations were used. The variable «LRGEN» of the Chapel Hill database defines the position of 
the party in terms of its overall ideological stance where 0 means extreme left, 5 means centre and 
10 means extreme right. In this paper, the case got 1 if there were both Eurosceptic parties with its 
overall ideological stance equal or higher than 6 and Eurosceptic parties with its overall ideological 
stance equal or less than 4 in the country. In the sample of this study in France in 2017, Greece in 
2012 and 2015, Italy in 2013 and the Netherlands in 2017 were both right and left Eurosceptic 
parties and these cases were marked with 1. In Austria in 2013, Greece in 2009, Hungary in 2014, 
Poland in 2015, Portugal in 2011, the UK in 2010 and 2017 there were not both right and left 
Eurosceptic parties and these cases were marked with 0. 
 
3.3.3. The salience of the issue 
According to theory, if the salience of the issue is low, it will prevent structuring public opinion 
even if elites are polarized (Down and Wilson, 2010).  
 
To measure the salience of the issue that parties attach in a country the Chapel Hill expert surveys 
were used in this study. The variable «EU_SALIENCE» of the Chapel Hill database defines 
relative salience of European integration in the party’s public stance. 11 point scale is used for it 
where 0 means that European integration is of no importance, never mentioned by a party and 10 
means that European integration is the most important issue for a party. 
 
To define the overall indicator for the whole country weighted arithmetic mean was used. The 
ability of the party to influence the agenda is affected by the party size. The more votes party has 
in a parliament, the more money and media attention it will have. The voices of the bigger parties 
will be heard better and if they pay more attention to the topic it will have a bigger impact, that the 
diligence of smaller parties. 
  
The formula of weighted arithmetic mean is: 
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𝑥F = 	∑ H𝑤J × 𝑥JKLJMN∑ (𝑊JLJMN )  
Where 𝑥F is the weighted mean variable; 𝑥J is the allocated weighted value; 𝑤J is the observed values.  
 
If salience of European integration in the parties’ public stance in a country is bigger than 5 in 
principle it can be defined that the salience of the issue is high. However, due to the politicization 
of the EU European integration has become a salient and contested issue in national elections 
(Grande and Kriesi, 2014, 198-199), so the threshold for what is high salience should be stricter 
to be meaningful. In the sample of this study, there are no cases where the salience was smaller 
than 5 and the average estimation of the salience of European integration is 6,762548568, in other 
words, it is higher than the projected threshold. In this regard, in this study, it was decided that if 
the salience of European integration in the parties’ public stance in a country is bigger or equal to 
7 it would be defined as high salience and marked with 1, if the weighted arithmetic mean is 
smaller than 7 it would be defined as low salience and marked with 0. In the sample of the study 
France in 2017, Greece in 2012, Portugal in 2011 and the UK in 2017 were marked with 1. And 
Greece in 2009, Greece in 2015, the UK in 2010, Austria in 2013, Hungary in 2014, Italy in 2013, 
the Netherlands in 2017 and Poland in 2015 were marked with 0. 
 
3.3.4. Ideological coherence  
According to the theory, ideological cohesion should enhance the influence of elite polarization 
on mass polarization because If a party is divided on the issue, the capacity to build public opinion 
will be lower. The contradictory messages will blur the cues and supporters will not get it (Ray 
2003, 980-981).  
 
To measure ideological coherence of parties about the EU dimension the Chapel Hill expert 
surveys were used in this study. The variable «EU_DISSENT» of the Chapel Hill database defines 
the degree of dissent of parties on European integration. 11 point scale is used for it where 0 means 
that party was completely united and 10 means that party was extremely divided. To define the 
overall indicator for the whole country weighted arithmetic mean was used again due to the same 
reasons. The voices of the bigger parties will be heard better and if they are united it will have a 
bigger impact than the united voice of smaller parties. 
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If the weighted arithmetic mean of the degree of dissent of parties on European integration is lower 
than 4 it would be defined as united and marked with 1, if the weighted arithmetic mean of the 
degree of dissent of parties on European integration is equal or bigger than 6 it would be defined 
as not ideologically united and marked with 0. In the sample of this study Austria in 2013, France 
in 2017, Greece in 2012, Greece in 2015, Hungary in 2014, Italy in 2013, the Netherlands in 2017, 
Poland in 2015, Portugal in 2011 and the UK in 2017 were marked with 1. And Greece in 2009 
and the UK in 2010 were marked with 0. 
 
3.3.5. Party size 
According to the theory, party size can be an important factor in studying mass polarization. Level 
of congruence between voters and parties will be higher in countries with many small parties and 
lower in countries with a lower number of large parties (Down and Wilson, 2010). At the same 
time, it is important to control for a party system because studying polarization in a multi-party 
system can differ from studying it in a two-party system (Thomsen, 2014, 786.). The system is 
absolutely polarized when there are two big parties on different sides of the ideological scale and 
it is more likely in two-party systems than in a multi-party system.  
 
There are different ways to control for party size and the type of the system. The types of systems 
can be encoded. In this paper this way wasn’t chosen as in the EU there are mixed types and many 
other elements like thresholds, the registration and funding rules that are not included in the type 
of the system but can considerably support or constrain small parties. For example, in Hungary, 
there is a mixed type system but it significantly favours big parties (Bogaards, 2018, 1485-1487). 
Down and Wilson measured average party vote share and divided countries into two groups where 
the median party was small and where it was big (2010, 78). It can be a way but dividing the cases 
into two groups based on the comparison to each other is not the most objective method. It is why 
the effective number of elective parties (also known as Eff Nv and ENEP) was chosen as an 
indicator. The formula of the effective number of elective parties is: 
 𝑁Q = 1∑(𝑃Q)C 
 
Where 𝑃Q is party’s proportion of the total votes. 
 
The effective number of elective parties shows the degree of fragmentation of a party system at 
the electoral level. It cannot tell everything about the party system, but it shows if it is a big or 
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small party system. For example, if it is equal to 2.78, it means that “party system is as fragmented 
as if it contained exactly 2.78 equal-sized parties” (Gallagher and Mitchell, 2008, 598). Gallagher 
and Michael mentioned that effective number of elective parties maintained the position of the 
most widely used measure as Lijphart once called it (2008, 599). 
 
The value of the factor for the cases of the sample of this study was taken from Gallagher and 
Michael’s election indices dataset (Gallagher and Michael, 2019). If the effective number of 
elective parties was bigger than 3 or equal to 3 it was perceived that it is a system with small parties 
and was marked with 0. If the effective number of elective parties was smaller than 3 it was 
perceived that it is a system with big parties and was marked with 1. In the sample of the study 
Greece in 2009, Hungary in 2014, Poland in 2015, Portugal in 2011, the UK in 2010 and 2017 
were marked with 1. And Austria in 2013, France in 2017, Italy in 2013, the Netherlands in 2017, 
Greece in 2012, Greece in 2015were marked with 0. 
 
3.3.6. Political awareness 
Some authors claim that although polarization can help to build an opinion about politics, the effect 
is limited by political awareness (Layman and Carsey, 2002; Ray 2003, 981).  
 
According to some studies, from all possible characteristics only education turned out to be the 
significant factor (Hetherington, 2001, 626-628) and it was a proxy indicator of political 
awareness. To interpret partisan cues on the European dimension correctly the higher level of 
knowledge is needed (Hobolt, 2007, 168). It means that the more citizens know about European 
politics and the more they are interested in it, the more they should be exposed to the parties’ cues 
on the European dimension. Although it is personal characteristics, the level of political 
engagement varies from country to country in the EU (Kitanova, 2019), which means that the 
common level of the knowledge about the EU politics and interest in it can vary from country to 
country as well. 
 
To measure it two proxy indicators were used. For the first indicator the question of Eurobarometer 
“When you get together with friends or relatives, would you say you discuss frequently, 
occasionally or never about European political matters”. The question was coded as QA1 in 2009, 
as QA2 since 2010 and until 2012, as D71 since 2013. The answers are: Frequently, Occasionally, 
Never and DK. The high level of interest in the EU implies that European political matters are 
frequently discussed. For the threshold the average EU value was used. If the per cent of people 
who frequently discuss European political matters in a country is bigger than the average in the 
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EU countries it was perceived that the level of interest in the EU is high and was marked with 1. 
If it was less the level of interest in the EU was estimated as low and was marked with 0. In the 
sample of the study Austria in 2013, the Netherlands in 2017, the UK in 2017, Greece in 2009, 
2012 and 2015 were marked with 1. And Hungary in 2014, Poland in 2015, Portugal in 2011, the 
UK in 2010, France in 2017, Italy in 2013 were marked with 0. 
 
The second indicator showed knowledge about the EU. At the Eurobarometer surveys there is the 
of questions about the EU such as “For each of the following statements about the EU could you 
please tell me whether you think it is true or false”: 
• The EU currently consists of 28 Member States; 
• The members of the European Parliament are directly elected by the citizens of 
each Member State; 
• Switzerland is a Member State of the EU. 
  
There is also per cent of right answers in average in a country. This value was used to estimate the 
level of political awareness of the EU. To determine the high level of political awareness the 
average EU value was used. If the per cent of people who answered all questions correctly is bigger 
than the average in the EU countries it was perceived that the level of political awareness of the 
EU is high and was marked with 1. If it was less the level of political awareness was estimated as 
low and was marked with 0. In the sample of the study Austria in 2013, Hungary in 2014, Portugal 
in 2011, Greece in 2009, 2012 and 2015 were marked with 1. The Netherlands in 2017, Poland in 
2015, France in 2017, Italy in 2013, the UK in 2017 and 2010 were marked with 0. 
 
The data was got from the closet to national elections Eurobarometer reports as the task of this 
study is to understand when mass became polarized in times of elite polarization.  
 
3.3.7. The EU crisis 
Special moments such as major treaty negotiations and crisis contribute to creating an opportunity 
structure (De Wilde and Zürn, 2012, 138-139). Especially important are the crisis at the EU level 
because it provokes debate about the EU (Vasilopoulou, 2018, 312) and forces the political parties 
to develop more differentiated positions on it (Grande and Kriesi, 2014, 217). In this study the 
case was marked with 1 if in time of it there was European migrant crisis, European debt crisis or 
Brexit. Even if the crisis did not hurt the country heavily, it could affect the political agenda. In 
this study Austria in 2013, Greece in 2012 and 2015, Poland in 2015, Italy in 2013, Portugal in 
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2011, France in 2017, the Netherlands in 2017, the UK in 2010 and in 2017 were marked with 1. 
Greece in 2009 and Hungary in 2014 were marked with 0. 
 
3.3.8. Media coverage 
Media attention for EU issues provoke politicization (De Wilde and Zürn, 2012, 138-139) so it 
can enhance the polarization process. To define if media coverage was high or not the proxy 
indicator was used. In the Eurobarometer reports «Media use in the European Union» is a question 
Generally speaking, do you think that «the (NATIONALITY) ... talk(s) too much, about the right 
amount or too little about the EU? ». This question is asked about television, radio, press and 
websites. For this study television coverage was used. Although the per cent of people who use 
television when look information about the EU have been decreasing since 2005, by 2017 it still 
was the main source of information: 48 per cent of people in the EU chose it (European 
Commission, Brussels (2018): Eurobarometer 88.3 (2017). TNS opinion, Brussels [producer]. 
GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA6928 Data file Version 1.0.0).  
 
If per cent of people who answered that television talks too little about the EU is bigger than the 
average in the EU countries, it was estimated that the media coverage is too low and the case was 
marked with 1, otherwise it was marked with 0. In the sample of this study, France in 2017 and 
the Netherlands in 2017 were marked with 1. Austria in 2013, Hungary in 2014, Portugal in 2011, 
Italy in 2013, Poland in 2015, the UK in 2017 and 2010, Greece in 2009, 2012 and 2015 were 
marked with 0.  
 
The data was got from the closet to national elections Eurobarometer reports as a task of this study 
is to understand when mass became polarized in times of elite polarization.   
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4. Analysis. QCA 
When all factors were calibrated truth table was created. 
 
Table 3. Truth table of conditions leading elite polarization to cause public opinion polarization 
Case 
Low 
media 
salien
ce 
Cohere
nt 
Salie
nt 
EU 
crisi
s 
Euroskept
ics 
Right and 
left 
Euroskept
ics 
Big 
parti
es 
Discu
ss 
Awaren
ess 
Austria 
2013 
0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 
France 
2017 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Greece 
2009 
0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 
Greece 
2012 
0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
Greece 
2015 
0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 
Hungary 
2014 
0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Italy 
2013 
0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Netherlan
ds 2017 
1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 
Poland 
2015 
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Portugal 
2011 
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 
UK 2010 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 
UK 2017 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 
 
After the first test the results were not credible. As there was set threshold consistency of these 
solutions (and all others) is higher than 0.75 for sufficiency and than 0.9 for necessity. The 
coverage is equal to 0.2 in 3 of 4 solutions and is equal to 0.4 in the last solution. The close the 
coverage is to 1, the better. The close the coverage is to 1, the better. Although the low coverage 
does not mean that the results are irrelevant (2017, 17), in this case all solutions have low coverage. 
It means that theoretical assumptions should be reconsidered. 
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Table 4. The intermediate solution with awareness 
Solutions inclS PRI covS covU cases 
1 
COHERENT*AWARENESS*low_media_salience*
EUROSCEPTICS*DISCUSS*EU_CRISIS 
1 1 0.4 0.4 1;5 
2 
COHERENT*LOW_MEDIA_SALIENCE*EUROS
CEPTICS*RIGHT_AND_LEFT*SALIENT*EU_C
RISIS 
1 1 0.2 0.2 2 
3 
COHERENT*BIG_PARTIES*EUROSCEPTICS*D
ISCUSS*SALIENT*EU_CRISIS 
1 1 0.2 0.2 12 
4 
AWARENESS*EUROSCEPTICS*RIGHT_AND_L
EFT*DISCUSS*SALIENT*EU_CRISIS 
1 1 0.2 0.2 4 
M1 1 1 1  
 
It was decided to drop the political awareness condition. Theoretically, political awareness is a 
meaningful factor because to follow parties’ cues voters should understand where parties stand on 
the issue (Layman and Carsey, 2002; Ray 2003, 981). The way that was chosen in this paper to 
measure political awareness, in fact, reflects EU political knowledge that is not the same things. 
EU awareness means the capacity of citizens to understand EU politics at the elementary level, 
while EU political knowledge refers to “understanding of how the EU works and of the political 
means, objectives and strategies of European governance” (Fanoulis, 2018, 38). Political 
knowledge is not a precondition for civic engagement, EU awareness may be a sufficient factor 
(Fanoulis, 2018, 39). Furthermore, the citizens that are better informed about the EU can be less 
susceptible to party cues (Hobolt, 2005) so it can even negatively affect parties’ ability to influence 
voters. 
 
The coverage of solutions increased. The coverage of the first solution is equal to 0.2 in 2 of 3 
solutions and was equal to 0.4 in the last solution. 
 
Table 5. The intermediate solution with ideological coherence 
Solutions inclS PRI covS covU cases 
1 
COHERENT*low_media_salience*EUROSCEPTI
CS*DISCUSS*EU_CRISIS 
1 1 0.6 0.6 1;5;12 
2 
EUROSCEPTICS*RIGHT_AND_LEFT*DISCUS
S*SALIENT*EU_CRISIS 
1 1 0.2 0.2 4 
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3 
COHERENT*LOW_MEDIA_SALIENCE*EURO
SCEPTICS*RIGHT_AND_LEFT*SALIENT*EU_
CRISIS 
1 1 0.2 0.2 2 
M1 1 1 1  
 
Also, it was decided to drop ideological coherence factor. First of all, ideological coherence of all 
parties is rather high in all the cases of this study. The weighted arithmetic mean of the degree of 
dissent of parties on European integration was lower than the set threshold (4) only in 2 cases and 
even in these cases it was higher by 0,11 and 0,36. 
 
Table 6. The weighted arithmetic mean of the degree of dissent of parties on European 
integration (from 0 to 10) 
Case Coherent 
Austria 2013 2,352378 
France 2017 2,602385 
Greece 2009 3,67914 
Greece 2012 4,367906 
Greece 2015 3,201642 
Hungary 2014 2,810147 
Italy 2013 3,294651 
Netherlands 2017 2,472076 
Poland 2015 2,719911 
Portugal 2011 2,986659 
UK 2010 4,114609 
UK 2017 3,145591273 
 
There are not compelling theoretical reasons why 4 should be such a strict threshold and why such 
a small difference between cases should play a role. In all these cases it can be claimed that parties 
are ideologically united and if the factor does not vary it is not useful for QCA analysis.  
 
Dropping the ideological coherence factor decreased the number of solutions and increased the 
coverage. It is an acceptable outcome. However, one problem was found in a stage of interpretation 
of the solutions. When people answer that media tell about the EU too little, it shows not the real 
media coverage level but the level perceived by citizens. Low media coverage does not mean than 
it is low, it means that citizens in this period of time is not satisfied with it.  
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Table 7. The intermediate solution with low media salience 
Solutions inclS PRI covS covU cases 
1 
low_media_salience*EUROSCEPTICS*DISCUSS*EU_C
RISIS 
1 1 0.8 0.8 
1;5;4
;12 
2 
LOW_MEDIA_SALIENCE*EUROSCEPTICS*RIGHT_
AND_LEFT*SALIENT*EU_CRISIS 
1 1 0.2 0.2 2 
M1 1 1 1  
 
This indicator can be valuable for case study as it can provide valuable information about the 
process of mass polarization. However, for QCA it was replaced by another indicator. If per cent 
of people who answered that television talks too much about the EU is bigger than the average in 
the EU countries, it was estimated that the media coverage is high and the case was marked with 
1, otherwise it was marked with 0. In the sample of the study Austria in 2013, Hungary in 2014, 
Portugal in 2011, Italy in 2013, the UK in 2017 and 2010, Greece in 2009, 2012 and 2015 were 
marked with 1. And France in 2017, the Netherlands in 2017 and Poland in 2015 were marked 
with 0. When the media tells about the EU too much it reflects the situation of high media coverage 
better than if the media do not speak too little. The new truth table was created. 
 
Table 8. New truth table of conditions leading elite polarization to cause public opinion 
polarization 
Case 
Media 
salienc
e 
Salien
t 
EU 
crisis 
Euroskeptic
s 
Right and 
left 
Euroskeptic
s 
Big 
parties 
Discuss 
Austria 
2013 
1 0 1 1 0 0 1 
France 
2017 
0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Greece 
2009 
1 0 0 1 0 1 1 
Greece 
2012 
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
Greece 
2015 
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
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Hungary 
2014 
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 
Italy 2013 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 
Netherland
s 2017 
0 0 1 1 1 0 1 
Poland 
2015 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
Portugal 
2011 
1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
UK 2010 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
UK 2017 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
 
Unique coverage of the first solution decreased, while the raw coverage of the second solution 
increased. Raw coverage shows “how much of the outcome is covered”, while unique coverage 
shows “how much of the outcome is covered only by a specific path” (Schneider and Wagemann, 
2012, 133). It means that the less cases are explained only by the first solution, but more cases 
when public is polarized are explained by the second solution.  
 
Table 9. The final intermediate solution 
Solutions inclS PRI covS covU cases 
1 MEDIA_SALIENCE*EUROSCEPTICS*DISC
USS*EU_CRISIS 
1 1 0.8 0.6 1; 5; 
4; 12 
2 EUROSCEPTICS*RIGHT_AND_LEFT*SALI
ENT*EU_CRISIS 
1 1 0.4 0.2 2; 4 
M1 1 1 1  
 
According to the results of this study, when elite is polarized about the EU public opinion become 
polarized: 
1) If there is a crisis at the EU level, Eurosceptics reached 10% of electoral support, Eurosceptics 
present on both left and right sides of ideological scale and salience of European integration in the 
party’s public stance is high. 
2) If there is a crisis at the EU level, Eurosceptics reached 10% of electoral support, media salience 
of the EU is high and people often discuss the EU political matters.  
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The crisis at the EU level and sufficient electoral support of Eurosceptic parties are two essential 
conditions. These results are in line with theoretical expectations. The Eurosceptics play an 
important role in the politicization of the EU (Hernández and Kriesi, 2016, 517) and polarization 
is a part of this process. Euroskeptic parties increased the impact of party cues as they made party 
messages more distinct (Ray, 2003, 991). Eurosceptic parties tend to address these issues loudly 
(Adam et al., 2017) and when the public support for Eurosceptic parties reach a certain threshold, 
it became difficult for the mainstream parties to ignore this topic (Down and Wilson, 2010). The 
crisis at the EU level provokes polarization (Vries, 2018, 89) and increases the importance of the 
pro-/anti-EU dimension (Otjes and van der Veer, 2016).  
 
These two factors in a certain way provide actors and the moment provoking polarization and then 
the different set of factors cause it. In the first case, parties are responsible for it. They provide 
high salience of European integration in their public stance that helps to structure public opinion 
(Down and Wilson, 2010) and since there are Eurosceptic parties on both the left and the right side 
of the scale, they address voters also on both sides of the ideological spectrum (Down and Wilson, 
2010, 77-80; Hernández and Kriesi, 2016, 521).  
 
In the second case, the polarization is explained by high media salience that provokes politicization 
(De Wilde and Zürn, 2012, 138-139) and high interest of citizens in the EU politics that motivate 
them to follow parties’ cues on the EU (Layman and Carsey, 2002; Ray 2003) and media. 
 
These sets of conditions work both and in countries with small parties and in countries with big 
parties as it was expected theoretically. 
 
The following conditions are necessary for positive outcome: 
 
Table 10. Analysis of necessary conditions for positive outcome 
Solutions inclN RoN covN 
1 EUROSCEPTICS*EU_CRISIS 1 0.571 0.625 
2 big_parties+DISCUSS 1 0.571 0.625 
3 big_parties+SALIENT 1 0.571 0.625 
4 media_salience+DISCUSS 1 0.571 0.625 
5 RIGHT_AND_LEFT+DISCUSS 1 0.571 0.625 
6 DISCUSS+SALIENT 1 0.571 0.625 
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The following conditions are necessary for negative outcome: 
 
Table 11. Analysis of necessary conditions of negative outcome 
Solutions inclN RoN covN 
1 eurosceptics+salient 1 0.6 0.778 
2 BIG_PARTIES+media_salience+discuss 1 0.6 0.778 
3 media_salience+discuss+eu_crisis 1 0.8 0.875 
 
The following conditions are sufficient for positive outcome: 
  
Table 12. Analysis of sufficient conditions of negative outcome 
 
Big 
parti
es 
Media 
salien
ce 
Euroscepti
cs 
Righ
t 
and 
left 
Discu
ss 
Salie
nt 
EU 
crisi
s 
Ou
t 
n 
inc
l 
PR
I 
case
s 
28 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 
54 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
62 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 5 
64 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 
12
0 
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 12 
30 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 8 
58 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 7 
66 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 9 
10
0 
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 10 
11
3 
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 
11
4 
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 11 
11
7 
1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 
 
The EU crisis factor may look subjective and cast doubt on the validity of the results. If drop this 
factor the coverage value would decrease. The EU crisis factor unites all cases and without it, the 
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UK cases become more distinct: it is a two-party system, so there are not both right and left 
Eurosceptic parties and the public polarization in 2017 is mainly explained by Brexit that makes 
this case unique. If the UK is remoted from the sample of the analysis, the same results are 
received. It was also indicated that big party system indicator can vary because as it was shown in 
the original sample the mass polarization can be both and in the system with big parties and in the 
system with small parties. 
 
Table 13. The intermediate solution for sample without the UK and the EU crisis factor 
Solutions inclS PRI covS covU cases 
1 big_parties*MEDIA_SALIENCE*EUROSC
EPTICS*DISCUSS 
1 1 0.75 0.5 1; 5; 
4; 
2 big_parties*EUROSCEPTICS*RIGHT_AN
D_LEFT*SALIENT 
1 1 0.5 0.25 2; 4 
M1 1 1 1  
 
Almost the same results were received. The only difference is that in these solutions the mass 
polarization would appear only in the systems with small parties but it is explained by the fact that 
the UK was the only case when the mass polarization appeared in the system with big parties. 
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5. Analysis. Process tracing  
5.1. Mass polarization 
To unfold the mass polarization process in Greece over time it was decided to count mass 
polarization since 2008 and until February 2019 when the latest individual level results of 
Eurobarometer surveys were published. 
 
Figure 1. Mass polarization in Greece 
 
 
First of all, the Figure 1 shows that mass polarization is not stable. The level of mass polarization 
fluctuates in the constrained range from 0,8 to about 1,2. Several significant rises and falls are seen 
in the studied period. To look at the bigger picture it was decided to analyze how the attitude to 
the EU was changing over time. 
 
Figure 2. Public opinion on the image of the EU 
 
Source: European Commission (European Commission, n.d.). 
 
The figure 2 shows that the public opinion had started to change since November 2009. Since 
November 2009 the per cent of respondents who thought that the EU has a fairly positive image 
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started to decrease, while the per cent of respondents who thought that the EU has a fairly negative 
image started to increase. 
 
One important observation is that mass polarization was climbing before the 2012 elections. The 
per cent of people who said that EU conjures up for fairly negative and very negative image was 
increasing and the per cent of people who said that EU conjures up for fairly positive image was 
decreasing steadily since November 2009 that coincide with the elections and the beginning of the 
crisis in Greece. The per cent of people who said that EU conjures up for a very positive image 
also dropped in 2009 significantly. Although according to the index public opinion was not 
polarized in 2009, it is a point in time when public opinion started to change.  
 
The public polarization reached a peak in May of 2011. By that time almost equal parts of society 
thought that the EU had a fairly positive and fairly negative image, and the per cent of people who 
are neutral towards the EU decreased significantly. Now it is seen that the society became 
polarized before elections 2012. Then there was a significant decrease in mass polarization in 
November of 2011. The value of index decreased as the per cent of people having a neutral attitude 
to the EU increased by about 5 per cent and the per cent of people having a very positive attitude 
to the EU decreased. A neutral position is marked as 3, it is the middle of the scale. At the same 
time, the per cent of people who believe that the EU has a fairly positive and per cent of people 
who believe that the EU has fairly negative image stayed almost in the same proportion. 
Figure 3. Trust in the EU 
 
Source: European Commission (European Commission, n.d.). 
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The Figure 3 shows that the crisis caused a rise in Euroscepticism. Greek society blamed the EU 
for economic problems and loss of sovereignty as the EU was linked with the crisis. The economic 
crisis coincided with the migration crisis that severely affected Greece. As the result, the Greek 
population thought that the EU did not do enough to help and in autumn 2015 the level of distrust 
in the EU reached 81 per cent, representing 25 per cent more than the EU average. 
 
Due to the research question of this study and the dynamics of changes in mass polarization, it is 
important to understand why mass polarization was low in 2009-2010, why it became high in May 
2011, what caused the drop in mass polarization in November 2011, and why mass polarization 
became high in 2012 and stayed high in 2015. 
 
5.2. Elite polarization 
Although parties were already polarized in 2009 by 2012 they took more radical positions. In fact, 
in 2012 it was a peak of elite polarization. In 2009 it was equal to 1.898882, in 2012 it was equal 
to 2.134811 and in 2015 it again decreased to 1.853105. Although an increased level of 
polarization can explain why voters became polarized in 2012, it cannot explain why voters stayed 
polarized in 2015 when the level of elite polarization was just like in 2009. 
 
Figure 4. Overall orientation of the party leadership towards European integration in Greece 
 
Source: Chapel Hill Survey 
 
Some important things can be noticed if look at how parties change their positions on the EU 
integration over the time. Index of polarization reflects how ideologically far from each other are 
parties but it weighted by party size due to the theoretical expectations that the bigger parties are, 
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the more influence it can have. The Figure 4 shows that although elite polarization is a bit bigger 
in 2009, the variety of ideological positions is greater in 2015. There are Potami, PASOK, ND on 
the one edge of the scale and KKE and XA on the another. Since SYRIZA is closer to the middle 
of the scale (the position is equal to 5,2) and it got 35,5 per cent of votes, it reduces the value of 
elite polarization index.  
 
Figure 5. Parties position on the European integration in Greece 
 
Source: The Manifesto Project database 
 
It is better seen in a plot based on manifesto project data (Figure 5) as they use bigger scale, another 
method analyze parties’ positions (manifestos instead of expert surveys) and analyze all 5 elections 
that took place since 2009 until 2015. The parties became more radical by 2012, and although they 
became more moderate by 2015, the variance of the positions was still bigger than it was in 2009. 
Also, it is seen that parties’ positions became significantly more radical in the elections taking 
place in June 2012.  
 
As it was theoretically expected, the mainstream parties PASOK and ND stuck to the pro-EU 
positions, despite the electoral success of Eurosceptic parties in 2012 (Vasilopoulou, 2018, 319). 
Most challenger parties chose Eurosceptic positions, but not all of them (Vasilopoulou, 2018, 312). 
The crisis, shift in Greek public opinion, the electoral success of Eurosceptic parties increased the 
relevance of Eurosceptic voices (Vasilopoulou, 2018, 323). At the same time, although SYRIZA 
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put forward a hard Eurosceptic position, the party mitigated it when it won elections and got into 
government (Vasilopoulou, 2018, 312). 
 
The economic frames were predominant for both pro-EU parties, PASOK and ND, and 
Eurosceptic parties. The far-right Eurosceptic parties, LAOS, ANEL, and the Golden Dawn, also 
used security frames, foreign interference, cultural/nationalistic frames. The far-left party KKE 
used labour/social security frames, foreign interference, claimed that the EU policies were anti-
popular and even used nationalist frames, but focused on popular sovereignty. The far-left 
SYRIZA used similar frames, and economic and security frames as well were of paramount 
importance (Vasilopoulou, 2018, 322-323). 
 
5.3. The presence of both right and left Eurosceptic parties 
 
Another important thing is that in 2009, in constant to 2012 and 2015, there were not Eurosceptic 
parties on both edges of Left–Right ideological scale. In 2009 there was only more pro-European 
right parties and more Eurosceptic left parties.  
 
Figure 6. Positions of parties on the EU integration and Left–Right ideological scale in 2009 
 
Source: The Manifesto Project database 
 
While in 2012 and 2015 there were both left and right Eurosceptic and pro-European parties. 
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Figure 7. Positions of parties on the EU integration and Left–Right ideological scale in 2012 
 
Source: The Manifesto Project database 
 
Figure 8. Positions of parties on the EU integration and Left–Right ideological scale in 2015 
 
Source: The Manifesto Project database 
 
5.4. The number of parties 
The number of parties increased respectively. The effective number of elective parties was 2,59 in 
2009, then it increased to 3,79 in 2012 and then slightly decreased to 3,09 in 2015 but stayed at 
the level higher than it was in 2009. Until 2012 Greece was a classic two-party system, but in 2012 
the dynamics of the traditional Greek party system changed. In the elections of 2009, PASOK took 
46 per cent of votes and ND took 35 per cent. 
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Figure 9. The official result of the 2009 election 
 
Source: Hellenic Parliament 
 
In the election in May 2012, no party won the majority and coalition government was not formed. 
In one month the second election was held where the pro-austerity party New Democracy won and 
got 31 per cent of votes. Overall there were 7 parties in the parliament comparing to 5 parties in 
2009. 
 
Figure 10. The official result of the 2012 elections 
 
Source: Hellenic Parliament 
 
In these elections were two groups of parties: parties that supported the bailout agreements were 
PASOK and New Democracy, and parties that opposed the bailout agreements were KKE, 
SYRIZA, Democratic Left, Golden Dawn and ANEL (Vasilopoulou, 2018, 315). The electoral 
success of Eurosceptic parties was not only related to Euroscepticism. Two pro-EU mainstream 
parties, PASOK and ND, were associated with clientelism, corruption and austerity measures, 
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while the anti-system character of the challenger parties contributed to their electoral success 
(Vasilopoulou, 2018, 323-324).  
 
Pappas believes that the unusual fragmentation in 2012 elections can be explained by the specifics 
of the Greek party system. Pappas claims that after 1981 in Greece the «polarized bipartism» has 
been shaped. It is the system that combines two-party politics and elite polarization. It allowed 
keeping society divided into two groups (2013, 40). In conditions of such «polarized bipartism» 
parties tend to reduce the competition to a single dimension. Two biggest parties present the 
opposite opinions and prefer to increase polarization to get more votes. However, as Pappas 
mentions «when politics is polarized, bipartism does not work». When bipartism fails to produce 
a moderate political society, the political instability emerges and as a result the number of parties 
increases or a type of party system changes (2013, 41-42).  
 
In 2015 SYRIZA, that used to be a marginal party in 2009, won elections and got firstly 40 per 
cent of votes and then 38 per cent of votes. There were 7 parties in the parliament and then 8. 
 
Figure 11. The official result of the 2015 elections 
 
Source: Hellenic Parliament 
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5.5. Salience 
According to Chapel Hill database, the salience of European integration in the party’s public stance 
was extremely high only in 2012, when the weighted mean was equal to 8,9. In 2009 the weighted 
mean was equal to 6,6 and in 2015 it was equal to 6,7. Interestingly, the Figure 12 shows that the 
parties, whose positions became more radical, also increased the salience of European integration. 
Although according to Vasilopoulou, the EU issues were salient across the party system and over 
time (2018, 321).  
 
Figure 12. Positions of parties on EU integration and the salience of EU integration 2009-2012 
 
Source: The Manifesto Project database 
5.6. The crisis 
2009-2010 
On 4 October 2009 George Andreas Papandreou, the leader of the social-democratic party the 
Panhellenic Socialist Movement, wins national elections. In December he admits that the debt of 
the country was equal to 300bn euros. It was the highest debt in modern history and amounted to 
113 per cent of GDP of the country, while the eurozone limit was 60 per cent (Timeline: The 
unfolding eurozone crisis, 2019). Greece was already in crisis in 2009 but the danger was played 
down on the public agenda and it was the EU level crisis at that time. George Papandreou claimed 
that Greece was "not about to default on its debts" (Greece insists it will not default on huge debts, 
2019). 
 
The per cent of respondents who had positive expectations for the year to come increased in 
November 2009. 
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Figure 13. Economic expectations in Greece
 
Source: European Commission (European Commission, n.d.). 
 
If we look at how citizens estimated the current financial situation of their household, we could 
see the similar picture. The financial satiation was constantly getting worse since autumn 2009. 
 
Figure 14. The financial situation of the household 
 
Source: European Commission (European Commission, n.d.). 
 
The per cent of respondents who had positive expectations for the year to come increased in the 
EU average as well. 
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Figure 15. Economic expectations in EU 
 
Source: European Commission (European Commission, n.d.). 
 
In May 2010 the negative expectations increased by 30 per cent. The negative expectations in the 
EU average also increased but only by 5 per cent, and without Greece it increased only by 3 per 
cent. 
 
In February 2010 Greece develops austerity measures to curb the deficit. On 2 May 2010 the 
International Monetary Fund and the EU agreed to loan Greece 110 billion of euro. Prime Minister 
Papandreou commits to austerity measures (Eurozone approves massive Greece bail-out, 2019). 
The austerity measures plan provoked protests. It was the first wave of the anti-austerity protests. 
According to police data, in 2010 there were 7123 protest events and the protests intensified after 
the first bailout agreement was signed in May 2010 (Karyotis and Rüdig, 2018, 160). According 
to the study of Karyotis and Rüdig, 23% of the adult population responded that they took part in 
anti-austerity demonstrations in 2010. However, the most important predictor of participation was 
the experience of protest activity before the crisis (2018, 160). Although it was massive protests, 
the activists failed to mobilize new participants. Other predictors were being male, left-wing and 
from a trade union, that reflects “old social movements” profile (Karyotis and Rüdig, 2018, 165). 
 
2011 
May 
The second wave of protests took place in 2011. In 2011 there was a greater number of participants 
and greater types of its activities. During the survey, 36 per cent of the adult population took part 
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in demonstrations comparing with 23 per cent in 2010. In 2011 activists resorted to the occupation 
of public spaces such as Syntagma Square in front of the Greek Parliament, that was occupied 
from 25 May until 7 August 2011. The higher mobilization is at least partly explained by the rise 
of the Aganaktismeni. It was a new movement, inspired by 15M or Indignados movement that 
arose in Spain after mass demonstrations in May 2011 (Karyotis and Rüdig, 2018, 159). According 
to the theory, the appearance of the non-governmental actors is of paramount importance for 
intensification of conflict over Europe (2016, 76). 
 
Aganaktismeni movement represented the diversity of political views, including the far right 
(Karyotis and Rüdig, 2018, 161). As Karyotis and Rüdig claim, the protests in that time were 
characterized by “their inclusive and diverse nature, their fluid and leaderless structure and their 
use of and mobilization via digital media” (2018, 161). It shows that mobilization in 2011 was 
more effective than it used to be. 
 
November 
The negative expectations in Greece reached a peak in November 2011: 78 per cent of respondents 
said that the year to come would be worse when it comes to economics. At the exact same moment, 
the negative expectations in the EU average dramatically increased for the first time and reached 
a peak of 44%. 
 
In October 2011 the Greek parliament accepted the Fifth austerity package, that caused violent 
protests. In October Eurozone leaders discussed a haircut of 50 per cent and by the end of the 
month finally agreed to it in return for further austerity measures (Timeline: The unfolding 
eurozone crisis, 2019). 
 
George Papandreou announced a referendum on the rescue package, but then it was cancelled as 
the centre-right opposition agrees to support the deal. As ND and PASOK struggled to find an 
agreement, it was decided to form a technocratic government by agreement. Papandreou resigned 
and Lucas Papademos became a head of coalition government consisting of the PASOK, New 
Democracy, and LAOS parties (Smith and Kington, 2019). 
 
It was not a typical situation for Greece. The PASOK won a majority in the elections of 2009 and 
led the country on their own. In fact, Greek governments used to be one-party majority government 
since1974. The political landscape was also characterized by a polarization between New 
Democracy, The PASOK and some third party that could be labelled as the Communist party. In 
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the case of the new cabinet “the enduring nature of Greece’s polarization has been suspended 
momentarily” (Pastorella, 2016b, 129). The parties in the government were not ideologically close 
to each other. The PASOK is the left party, while New Democracy, and LAOS are the right. Their 
positions on the EU also were different. According to Chapel Hill survey, the position of the 
PASOK in time of the elections of 2009 was equal to 6,1, the position of ND was equal to 5,3 and 
the position of LAOS was equal to 3,3 on the scale where 1 is strongly opposed and 7 is strongly 
in favour.  
 
Prototype technocratic government is “a cabinet composed of all non-partisan, expert ministers 
and headed by a non-partisan prime minister, who has a sufficiently long period of time in power 
and sufficiently broad mandate to change the status quo” (Pastorella, 2016, 949). Papademos’ 
cabinet was not fully technocratic as it included politicians (not non-partisan experts), but it had a 
non-partisan prime minister and was claimed to be technocratic. In particular, Greek media 
promoted the idea of independence and technocracy (Pastorella, 2014, 10). The new cabinet was 
supposed to “create a climate of consensus after months of political tension" (Q&A: Greece's 
'technocratic' government, 2019). And it could be a reason why the per cent of people having a 
neutral attitude to the EU increased by about 5 per cent and the public polarization decreased.  
 
Greek political parties at that time preferred to avoid blaming each other, which is a classical 
strategy for such cases. It involves “a consensual solution among a coalition of the major political 
parties and ideas of national unity” (Pastorella, 2016b, 132). Technocratic governments often have 
widespread support as they perceived to be a government of national unity. Furthermore, 
technocracy prevents deliberation about policies due to the declared neutrality. It is perceived that 
the government does “what should be done according to scientific evidence” (Pastorella, 2016a, 
954). 
 
2012 
In February 2012 the Sixth austerity package was approved by the Parliament and the second 
bailout package was finalized. The Seventh austerity package was adopted by the parliament in 
November (Anger in Athens as Greek austerity measures passed, 2019). In May 2012 the general 
elections were held and then in one month in June. The Eurosceptic, anti-establishment, and anti-
austerity agenda became the main common denominator for the coalition government 
(Vasilopoulou, 2018, 312). 
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The per cent of people who judged the current financial situation as very bad reached a peak in 
May 2012 and was equal to 34 per cent. In November 2012 there was a second peak of per cent of 
respondents with the negative expectations about the economic situation in Greece: 76 per cent of 
respondents said that the year to come would be worse when it comes to economic. The negative 
expectations in the EU average also reached a peak of 41%. Since November 2012 the negative 
expectations about the economic situation in the country were decreasing both in Greece and the 
EU average.  
 
Also, the third wave of mobilization started from the middle of 2012, in the period of the electoral 
race to the May/June 2012 Parliamentary elections. In that time the Coalition of the Radical Left 
(SYRIZA), that used to be a marginal party, became the main party of the movement (Karyotis 
and Rüdig, 2018, 159). According to the police data, there were 5654 protest events in 2012. The 
peak was in March, then the number of events declined significantly but stayed high (Karyotis and 
Rüdig, 2018, 161). 
 
Figure 16. Monthly Number of Protest Events in Greece since 2010 until 2014 
 
Source: Karyotis and Rüdig on the basis of Hellenic Police Statistics (2018, 161). 
 
What distinguishes the third wave of austerity protests in Greece from other waves is the linkage 
to the electoral arena. While in other cases protesters were detached from political parties, in 
Greece it became identified with SYRIZA (Karyotis and Rüdig, 2018, 166). The SYRIZA opposed 
austerity measures, actively participated in the protests and its electoral support rose over time.  
 
SYRIZA provides populists rhetoric. According to the Chapel Hill survey, the party’s position on 
direct vs. representative democracy is equal to 6,9 in a scale where 10 means that “The people” 
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should make the most important decisions and 0 means that elected politicians should make the 
most important decisions. After the elections of June 2012 SYRIZA tried to represent diverse 
ideological groups the same as the Aganaktismenoi movement did. And what is more important 
SYRIZA was managed to strengthen the partisan ties with the demonstrators. 60 per cent of 
demonstrators did not feel close to any party and only 3 per cent felt close to SYRIZA in 2010, 
but 39 per cent of demonstrators said that they were close to SYRIZA in 2015 (Karyotis and Rüdig, 
2018, 166). 
 
2015 
The economic situation still was poor in Greece. In November 2015 the per cent of people who 
judged the current financial situation as very bad reached a peak and was equal to 34 per cent. The 
negative expectations became to rise since spring 2015 and in July 70 per cent of citizens in Greece 
thought that next year would be worse when it comes to economics. There was not an equal rise 
in the EU average. Also in 2015, the migration crisis started so Greece faced two the EU crisis at 
the same time.  
 
At the end of June Prime Minister Tsipras announced a referendum on a bailout agreement that 
could propel the country out of the euro (Tsipras’s shock call for vote on Greek bailout sets day of 
destiny for Europe, 2019). On 5 July 2015, the referendum was held and over 60 per cent voted 
against international bailout terms. The next days Samaras resigned as a leader of ND and 
Varoufakis resigned as minister of Finance (Greece debt crisis: Finance Minister Varoufakis 
resigns, 2019). Despite the results of the referendum on 11 July, the parliament approved the 
bailout plan and the new austerity measures for the third bailout package. On 20 August 2015 
Prime Minister Tsipras resigned. On 20 September 2015 the general legislative election was held. 
In November 2015 the new austerity package was accepted (Greece's Debt, 2019). According to 
theory, the referendum is the ideal opportunity structure for politicising European issues, it leads 
to higher polarization over Europe, the involvement of non-governmental actors and connected 
with a high-intensity mass conflict (Grande and Hutter, 2016, 77).  
 
According to Karyotis and Rüdig’s study that was conducted in February of 2015, 28% of 
respondents answered that they participated in protests after June 2012. In 2013 there were 6231 
protest events and 3032 protest events in the first half of 2014. It means that protest appeared in 
2010, raised further in 2011 until the middle of 2012, then the number of protests declined but 
stayed high between 2012 and 2015 (Karyotis and Rüdig, 2018, 161). 
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5.7. Political awareness 
It is seen that per cent of people who discuss European political matters with their friends or 
relatives frequently or occasionally were mostly increasing since 2009. It reached a peak in May 
of 2012 when the per cent of people who discuss European political matters frequently or 
occasionally increased by 12 per cent since may 2011. The per cent of people who discuss 
European political matters frequently itself also reached a peak in November of 2015.  
 
Figure 17. How often discuss EU political matters 
 
Source: Eurobarometer reports 
 
Although, it should be noticed that the level of political awareness was high in all studied periods. 
In 2009, 2012, and 2015 bigger per cent of people discussed European political matters frequently 
in Greece than in the EU overall. 
 
It is also interesting that in May of 2012 the per cent of people who found themselves persuading 
their acquaintances to share their view often or from time to time reached a peak. The per cent of 
people who do it often increased by 3 per cent since the last survey and who do it from time to 
time by 4. As it was claimed in a theoretical review it can be an important symptom of polarization. 
Elite polarization does not necessary lead to issue polarization, people can stay moderate but there 
can be other symptoms. Particularity, population can become more fragmented and further 
entrenched in their points of view (Cacciatore et al., 2014, 658-660). It shows that although the 
value of public polarization was lower in 2012 than it was in May of 2011, the occurring trends 
were also significant. 
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Figure 18. How often persuade to share views 
 
Source: Eurobarometer reports 
 
The index of media use was also increasing since the beginning of the crisis. The per cent of people 
with very high media use increased constantly until 2015. 
 
Figure 19. Media use index 
 
Source: Eurobarometer reports 
 
As a result, per cent of people who felt that in Greece people are not well informed or not at all 
informed (total not well informed) were decreasing since 2012, while per cent of people who felt 
that in Greece people are fairly well informed or very well informed (total well informed) were 
increasing since that time. 
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Figure 20. How well informed about European matters 
 
Source: Eurobarometer reports 
 
5.8. Media coverage 
The per cent of people who believed that television talks too much about the EU were increasing 
since 2010 and until 2015. In 2011 the per cent of people who believed that television talks too 
much about the EU increased by almost 10 per cent and kept this high level until 2015. The peak 
was in 2014, the year of the European Parliament election.  
 
Figure 21. How much television talks about the EU 
 
Source: Eurobarometer reports 
 
The television is the main source of information, but the importance of other sources is increasing 
over time (European Commission, Brussels (2018): Eurobarometer 88.3 (2017). TNS opinion, 
Brussels [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA6928 Data file Version 1.0.0). If look at 
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the radio, television and press coverage of the EU issues it is seen there are two peaks in 2012 and 
in 2014. 
 
Figure 22. Greek media talks too much 
 
Source: Eurobarometer reports 
 
It should be noticed that in all studied periods a bigger per cent of people believed that television 
talks too much about the EU in Greece than in the EU average. According to the study of Capelos 
and Exadaktylos, in general, the EU actors were mentioned in 17 per cent of cases, while domestic 
political leaders was mentioned in 38 per cent. It means that although the EU was an important 
topic of public agenda, the domestic politics was of a paramount importance. EU actors were at 
the core of public agenda in December 2009 and November 2011, when the EU actors were 
mentioned in 25 per cent of cases (2017, 86). 
 
Thematically three were three stages of media coverage of the Greek crisis. Since December 2009 
and until May 2010 the print media outlets stressed how grave was the crisis, since June 2010 until 
December 2011 media stressed the public frustration, and since early 2012 media stressed the 
public disappointment in political system (Capelos and Exadaktylos, 2017, 78). Also since June 
2010 scientists find that media discuss the crisis using “them versus us” narrative (Capelos and 
Exadaktylos, 2017, 81). The Greek media reflected the crude line of international news agencies. 
After 2010–2011 the Greek media became polarized. Dominant media, that included TV-channels, 
supported Troika decisions. Since November 2011, when the referendum was announced, these 
media strongly supported euro and those parties who shared their positive attitude to the EU. 
Several newspapers, who were less powerful, and internet media adopted the opposite position 
and the dichotomy was observable in all conflicts (Kaitatzi-Whitlock, 2014, 36-37). 
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According to the public opinion surveys, the objectivity of the EU presentation in media changed 
from time to time. It is seen that in time since 2011 and until 2015 the television presented the EU 
less objective. 
 
Figure 23. Objectivity of the Greek television 
 
Source: Eurobarometer reports 
 
If we look at other sources of the information it is seen that 2012 was the year when people the 
most believed that the EU was not presented objectively. 
 
Figure 24. The Greek media present the EU objectively 
 
Source: Eurobarometer reports 
 
It should be noticed that in all studied periods a bigger per cent of people believed that media does 
not present the EU objective in Greece than in the EU average.  
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5.9. Summary 
As it was claimed at the beginning it is important to understand: 1) why mass polarization was low 
in 2009-2010 and became high in May 2011 before new elections; 2) what caused the drop in mass 
polarization in November 2011 in comparison to May 2011; 3) Why mass polarization became 
high in 2012 and stayed high in 2015, while it was low in 2012, although elite polarization in all 
these cases were high. 
 
May 2011 vs. November 2011 
All conditions that fostered polarization in May 2011 existed and were even stronger in November 
2011. The only factor that theoretically can explain the drop is technocratic government. 
Papademos’ cabinet was not fully technocratic but it had a non-partisan prime minister and was 
claimed to be technocratic and independent by media (Pastorella, 2014, 10). The new cabinet was 
supposed to “create a climate of consensus after months of political tension" (Q&A: Greece's 
'technocratic' government, 2019). And it could be a reason why the per cent of people having a 
neutral attitude to the EU increased by about 5 per cent and the public polarization decreased.  
 
To compare the rest 4 cases the presence of factors was visualized. All factors located in 
comparison to each other to reflect when the value of the factor was higher.  
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Figure 25. Factors influencing mass polarization 
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2009-2010 vs. May 2011 
The next elections after 2009 was held in 2012 so technically the number of parties, level of elite 
polarization and the presence of both right and left parties were the same in 2009 and 2011. 
However, in 2011 the Aganaktismeni movement became an important actor of protest political 
arena (Karyotis and Rüdig, 2018, 159). As it was non-governmental actor, actively mobilized 
citizens and represented diversity of political views, including the far right (Karyotis and Rüdig, 
2018, 161). So, in fact, the number and ideological diversity of actors increased in 2011.  
 
The crisis in 2011 had deteriorated a bit and the tension on the EU level also increased, but the 
difference between 2009-2010 and 2011 in this sense was not large. The another factor is 
opportunity structure. There were not elections in 2011 and were in 2009, that should theoretically 
foster polarization in 2009. But in 2011 the opportunity structure was strengthened by the protests. 
Although, there were protests in 2010, the activists failed to mobilize new participants and the 
most important predictor of participation was the experience of protest activity before the crisis 
(2018, 160).  
 
Political awareness stayed at the same level, although the index of media usage increased by 10 
per cent. According to the study of Capelos and Exadaktylos, the EU actors were at the core of 
public agenda in December 2009 and November 2011 (2017, 86). But according to public survey, 
media spoke about the EU more in 2011. Although, in 2009, according to public opinion, media 
was more biased that should provoke polarization.  
 
2012 and 2015 vs. 2009-2010 
In 2012 there was the highest level of elite polarization and mass polarization in comparison with 
2009-2010 and 2012. Many factors that should theoretically foster mass polarization also had the 
highest value in 2012. There were the highest level of ideological diversity, the biggest number of 
parties, both right and left Eurosceptic parties. The crisis significantly deteriorated by that time 
and became European. In November 2012 there was a second peak of per cent of respondents with 
the negative economic expectations in Greece and the negative expectations in the EU average 
also reached a peak of 41%. 
 
In 2012 the salience of the topic reached a peak, media coverage reached a peak and the biggest 
per cent of people believed that media was biased. The media coverage was also high, it was higher 
only in 2015. 
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The political situation in 2012 was also important. SYRIZA became the main party of the 
movement so the protest could be expressed in the electoral arena. SYRIZA tried to represent 
diverse ideological groups and what is more important SYRIZA was managed to strengthen the 
partisan ties with the demonstrators (Karyotis and Rüdig, 2018, 166). The election of 2012 was a 
key moment for mass polarization as all parties were divided into two groups: parties that 
supported the bailout agreements and parties that opposed it (Vasilopoulou, 2018, 315). The 
elections were linked with the EU political dimension and the results had a direct impact on the 
citizens' life. 
 
There was a high level of public awareness. The per cent of citizens who discussed European 
political matters frequently or occasionally reached a peak as well as per cent of people who found 
themselves persuading their acquaintances to share their view often or from time to time reached 
a peak. The number of protests was also high. 
 
So it is not surprising that in 2012 the mass polarization was high. It is more interesting why mass 
polarization in 2009 was low and in 2015 it was high, while the level of elite polarization was even 
a bit higher in 2009. The main two differences seem to be a number of parties and the presence of 
both right and left Eurosceptic. It used to be a two-party system in Greece and there was only more 
pro-European right parties and more Eurosceptic left parties. So the parties could not meet the 
demands of citizens. In 2015 Eurosceptics existed on both sides of the ideological spectrum and 
the number of parties was equal to 3,09 in 2015. Furthermore, while the value of the index of 
polarization was bigger in 2009, the ideological diversity was greater in 2015. 
 
Parties salience was the same. The media coverage according to public surveys were the highest 
in 2015, but according to Capelos and Exadaktylos, the EU actors were at the core of public agenda 
in December 2009 (2017, 86).  
 
Public awareness was higher in 2015 than in 2009. The per cent of people who discussed European 
political matters frequently itself also reached a peak in November of 2015. However, the level of 
political awareness was higher than in the EU average all the time.  
 
Since 2009 the crisis significantly deteriorated and became more European, also in 2015 the 
migration crisis took place. But in the sense of opportunity structure, the biggest role played the 
referendum. According to theory, the referendum is the ideal opportunity structure for politicising 
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European issues, it leads to higher polarization over Europe, the involvement of non-governmental 
actors and connected with a high-intensity mass conflict (Grande and Hutter, 2016, 77).  
 
These cases illustrate the results that were got through QCA. When elite is polarized the public 
opinion will be polarized if Eurosceptics parties reach a certain level of support, there are both 
right and left Eurosceptic parties, the topic is salient and there is EU crisis. These conditions were 
present in the case of 2015 and absent in the case of 2009. In the case of 2012 there also was a 
strong opportunity structure. The second set of factors also did not present in the case of 2009: 
high media attention, high salience, Eurosceptics parties reach a certain level of support, EU crisis 
and people often discuss the EU issues. The parties at the begging of the crisis played down the 
topic, the crisis was not perceived as the EU crisis, and the society was less involved in a 
discussion. 
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6. Conclusion  
According to the theory, elite polarization should lead to public polarization (Down and Wilson, 
2010; Ray, 2003; Hooghe and Marks, 2005). However, it does not always happen. Although the 
parties are polarized in the USA, many studies proved that across most issues Americans are 
ideologically moderate (Zingher and Flynn, 2018, 24). Also, Down and Wilson found that when 
elite polarization was high in some cases mass polarization was high but in some cases it was low 
in the EU (2010). It is especially relevant to understand the effect of elite polarization on mass 
polarization in times of the crisis of the EU as the EU crisis should influence «party competition 
over European integration, including EU issue position, EU issue salience, and EU issue framing» 
(Vasilopoulou, 2018, 312).  
 
To define what sets of conditions lead to mass polarization when parties are polarized, 12 cases 
with high elite polarization were selected. Applying Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) it 
was found out that when the elite is polarized regarding the EU public opinion become polarized: 
1) If there is a crisis at the EU level, Eurosceptics reached 10% of electoral support, Eurosceptics 
present on both left and right sides of the ideological scale and salience of European integration in 
the party’s public stance is high. 
2) If there is a crisis at the EU level, Eurosceptics reached 10% of electoral support, media salience 
of the EU is high and people often discuss the EU political matters.  
 
The process-tracing analysis helped to get more information about the case of Greece and how 
these conditions work in practice. In Greece, the elite had been polarized already in 2009, but the 
public opinion had not been polarized until 2012. Process tracing allowed to unfold the mass 
polarization process in conditions of elite polarization over time. It was found out that mass 
became polarized not in 2012 but in May 2011 in Greece. Technically the number of parties, level 
of elite polarization and the presence of both right and left parties were the same in 2009 and 2011. 
However, in 2011 the Aganaktismeni movement became an important actor of protest political 
arena (Karyotis and Rüdig, 2018, 159), so, in fact, the number and ideological diversity of actors 
increased in 2011. In 2011 the opportunity structure was also strengthened by the protests.  
 
Process tracing also helped to explain the difference between 2009 when public opinion was not 
polarized and 2012 and 2015 when it was. In 2012 there were many factors that should 
theoretically foster mass polarization: there was the highest level of ideological diversity, the 
biggest number of parties, both right and left Eurosceptic parties, the crisis significantly 
deteriorated by that time and became European, the salience of the topic reached a peak, media 
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coverage reached a peak and the biggest per cent of people believed that media was biased. The 
media coverage and the high level of public awareness were also high. SYRIZA became the main 
party of the movement so the protest could be expressed in the electoral arena. The election of 
2012 was a key moment for mass polarization as all parties were divided into two groups: parties 
that supported the bailout agreements and parties that opposed it (Vasilopoulou, 2018, 315). It is 
why in 2012 the mass polarization reached the highest level.  
 
It is more interesting why mass polarization in 2009 was low and in 2015 it was high, while level 
of elite polarization was even a bit higher in 2009. The main two differences seem to be a number 
of parties and the presence of both right and left Eurosceptic. It used to be a two-party system in 
Greece and there was only more pro-European right parties and more Eurosceptic left parties, 
while in 2015 Eurosceptics existed on both sides of the ideological spectrum and the number of 
parties was equal to 3,09. Furthermore, the ideological diversity was greater in 2015. Since 2009 
the crisis significantly deteriorated and became more European, also in 2015 the migration crisis 
took place. But in the sense of opportunity structure, the biggest role played the referendum. Some 
other factors like public awareness also had to provoke polarization greater in 2015 than in 2009. 
But it does not seem to play the main role at least because the level of political awareness was 
higher than in the EU average all the time. The case of Greece shows that a greater number of 
ideologically diverse parties that can effectively use the opportunity structure dramatically foster 
mass polarization. The EU crises, in turn, strengthen the opportunity structure.  
 
The process tracing also showed that mass polarization is less stable than it was supposed in the 
QCA part. Mass polarization varied all over the time and changed more often than elite 
polarization based on the results of elections. There was a significant drop in November 2011. The 
only factor that theoretically can explain the drop is settled technocratic government that was 
supposed to “create a climate of consensus after months of political tension" (Q&A: Greece's 
'technocratic' government, 2019).  
 
The thesis has several shortcomings. First of all, the elite polarization can be operationalized in 
another why. Also, the case of Greece in 2015 showed that ideological variance can be bigger than 
Dalton’s index’ elite polarization value and it can play a role so, perhaps, it is wrong to include 
the parties’ size in the index. The size of the party might be important to influence the legislative 
agenda but less important to influence public opinion. Also, the Aganaktismeni movement played 
an important role in mass polarization although it was a non-governmental actor. It was showed 
that mass polarization is not stable that the shorter periods should be studied. 
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Another issue is the role of the crisis. Society in Greece used to be pro-EU and increasing mass 
polarization was connected with the decrease in support of the EU. It is why the factor of crisis 
played such a big role. It should be relevant for other the EU member states as the EU is still highly 
supported (European Parliament, 2019) and maybe only in time of crisis the Eurosceptics can 
attract more pro-EU voters. In this sense, it might be analytically useful to replace polity questions 
with policy for measuring polarization. So, instead of for/against the EU questions look at what 
kind of Europe questions. Nowadays, when Eurosceptics do not promote the exit from the EU, it 
should have sense and may help to understand if the elite polarization regarding the EU issues 
influences mass polarization not in time of the EU crisis.   
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